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RULE 19 AND THE PUBLIC RIGHTS
EXCEPTION TO PARTY JOINDER
CARL TOBIASt

The increasing number of "public interest" lawsuits suggests that
federal courts increasingly will confront difficult party joinder questions
posed by such litigation. These problems arise because entities not involved in the litigation may have interests that may be adversely affected
by the litigation. The joinder issue presented by such cases is whether
rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the suit be
dismissed or whether the litigation can continue without joinder of the
absent entities. Numerous courts have dealt with the question by creating a ''public rights exception," which permits the litigation to continue
even without absentees whose interests may be at risk. However, no
court has clearly articulated or analyzed this exception. Because of this
failure, adoption of the exception has not resolved all of the joinder
problems raised by public rights litigation. In this Article Professor Tobias considers whether there is a better solution to these problems.
First, Professor Tobias considers the origins of the public rights exception. He then evaluates the judicial articulation of the exception and
reveals that courts have not explained the exception adequately or exhibited concern for interests other than those of the plaintiff. Professor Tobias then examines the procedural and statutory mechanisms currently
available for treating this party joinder issue. He concludes that the
courts should abandon the public rights exception and resolve the joinder question by applying these other mechanisms.

Federal courts increasingly confront a difficult question of party joinder
when "public interest litigants," such as the National Wildlife Federation, sue
the government over administrative agency activity. 1 These public interest litigants challenge an activity, like leasing of the public lands, but fail to join entities, such as major oil companies, holding oil and gas leases on the public lands.

t Professor of Law, University of Montana. I greatly appreciate the efforts of Rich Freer,
Elizabeth Gibson, Bill Luneburg, Richard Marcus, Peggy Sanner, Allan Stein, and Mark Weisburd
all of whom labored mightily to help me understand rule 19. Thanks also to Bradley Purcell for
valuable research assistance, the Harris Trust for generous, continuing support, and Beth Stevenson
and Bonita Summers for typing this Article. Errors that remain are mine.
1. A "public interest litigant" is an advocacy group that represents "unorganized 'public interests,'-interests shared by large numbers of individuals (such as consumers ...) who are not well
enough organized to pool their mutual stake in agency policies and participate effectively in the
informal administrative process on a par with .•. other organized economic interests." S. BREYER
& R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 1185 (2d ed. 1985). "Public
interest" or "public law" litigation is the activity pursued by public interest litigants before agencies
or courts to vindicate these interests. For general discussions of public interest litigants and litigation, see Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and The Burger Court, The Supreme Court 1981
Term, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1982) [hereinafter Chayes, Foreword]; Chayes, The Role of the Judge in
Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281 (1976) [hereinafter Chayes, Public Law Litigation];
Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 STAN. L. REv. 937 (1975).
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The entities have interests that may be adversely affected by a determination on
the merits favorable to the plaintiff. The party joinder issue that these suits
present is whether rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure2 requires that
the plaintiff's case be dismissed, whether absentees must be joined because joinder is feasible, or whether the litigation can continue without joinder of such
absentees. Numerous judges have treated this question by creating a "public
rights exception," which permits the plaintiff's suit to proceed in the absence of
entities that could be prejudiced should the litigation continue without them.
But no court has clearly articulated, analyzed, or substantiated the exception.
Moreover, most of these judges, out of apparent concern that plaintiffs have a
forum in which to contest agency activity and vindicate public rights, 3 have
evinced little express solicitude for interests of others, particularly absentees.
Furthermore, the plethora of varying factual contexts in which courts have been
asked to apply the public rights exception are difficult to generalize. The history
of recent public rights litigation, however, illustrates the problems that can attend invocation of the public rights exception.
In recent public rights litigation, trial judges have not required joinder of a
large number of geographically dispersed absentees that have spent millions of
2. Rule 19 provides:
(a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process and
whosejoinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action
shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of
the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a
practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the
persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has not been so joined,
the court shall order that he be made a party. Ifhe should join as a plaintiff but refuses to
do so, he may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the
joined party objects to venue and his joinder would render the venue of the action improper, he shall be dismissed from the action.
(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder Not Feasible. If a person as described in
subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in
equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or
should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to
be considered by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the extent to
which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the
person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
(c) Pleading Reasons for Nonjoinder. A pleading asserting a claim for relief shall state
the names, if known to the pleader, of any persons as described in subdivision (a)(l)-(2)
hereof who are not joined, and the reasons why they are not joined.
(d) Exception of Class Actions. This rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 23.
FED. R. C1v. P. 19. For brief descriptions of the rule, see infra notes 42-46, 126-32 and accompanying text. For thorough analysis, see 3A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE~ 19
(2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE]; 7 c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL §§ 1601-26 (1972).
3. For example, several environmental groups recently vindicated all citizens' interest in environmental quality by suing to restrain the National Park Service (NPS) "from approving mining
plans and access permits in Alaska's national parks until" the NPS complied with the National
Environmental Policy Act and its own regulations. See Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel,
803 F.2d 466, 467 (9th Cir. 1986).
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dollars exploring for, and developing, natural resources in reliance on government leases of public lands. When public interest litigants have successfully
challenged the propriety of government activity relating to lease issuance, trial
judges essentially have discontinued absentee exploration and development pursuant to the leases. Thus, the absentees have had to spend considerable time,
money, and effort participating in prolonged litigation. Indeed, the absentees
even could lose the substantial investments committed to exploration and development, should the federal judiciary ultimately reject their contentions, because
the absentees cannot secure satisfactory relief against the government under existing compensation schemes.4 In short, trial judges have not orderedjoinder of
absentees, despite the apparent significance of the absentees' interests.
Notwithstanding these complications, numerous courts that have recognized the public rights exception seem to have resolved correctly the relevant
party joinder question, especially by honoring rule 19's strong concern for providing the plaintiff a forum. It is difficult, however, to determine definitively if
most of these judges made appropriate decisions in light of rule 19's requirements or whether they properly completed the inquiry contemplated by the rule.
Moreover, it is impossible to determine how the remaining courts resolved the
joinder issue. Even if the conclusions reached were correct, the uncertainty engendered by the courts' lack of clarity has disrupted operations conducted by
absentees that were not required to be joined in the public rights suits. That
uncertainty has also led to protracted litigation, wasting public and private resources and undermining judicial credibility. Because public rights litigation is
burgeoning, the party joinder question that the public rights exception was fashioned to address will increasingly arise. These considerations make it important
to determine if there is a better solution to the joinder problem.
The first section of this Article analyzes the origins of the public rights
exception. The second section evaluates judicial articulation of the public rights
exception and reveals that courts have neither clearly enunciated the exception
nor expressly exhibited concern for pertinent interests other than those of the
plaintiffs. Moreover, this assessment suggests that the federal judiciary's recognition of the public rights exception was unwarranted. Accordingly, the third
section explores the procedural mechanisms currently available for treating the
party joinder issue addressed by the exception. Because this analysis demonstrates that these measures will enable courts not only to facilitate plaintiffs'
vindication of public rights but also to accommodate other relevant interests, the
Article concludes that the federal judiciary should abandon the public rights
4. The absentees cannot secure satisfactory relief because the government may have no technical legal obligation to them or the harm suffered may not support a cause of action. See infra notes
238-39 and accompanying text. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1609, 1612-14 (D.D.C. 1985) (mem.), ajf'd on rehearing, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1082, 1084-86
(D.D.C. 1986) (mem.), appeal filed, Nos. 86-5239, 86-5240 (D.C. Cir. 1986), and Conner v. Burford,
605 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mont. 1985), appeal filed, No. 85-3935 (9th Cir. argued July 11, 1986) illustrate the problems that can occur. For more comprehensive analysis of other contexts in which
courts have invoked the exception, see infra text accompanying notes 75-94. One of the most problematic difficulties in treating the exception is explaining how the party joinder question arises.
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exception and resolve the party joinder question by applying the additional
mechanisms.

I.

ORIGINS OF THE PUBLIC RIGHTS EXCEPTION

A. Early Party Joinder Concepts

1. Developments Prior to the Adoption of Original Federal Rule 19
English equity courts attempted to join every entity that had some interest
in a particular action, so as to minimize the possibilities of multiple and inconsistent litigation. 5 But comprehensive joinder was not a prerequisite to pursuit of a
claim or to entry of judgment before 1800. 6 At the end of the eighteenth century
the equity courts began finding certain entities so integrally related to specific
litigation that the case could not proceed in their absence. 7 For example, Lord
Chancellor Thurlow's 1787 decision in Fell v. Brown 8 was read as stating that a
second mortgagee's suit, which sought an accounting of rents and profits from a
first mortgagee, could not continue in the absence of the heir of the deceased
mortgagor. 9 Judges in the United States subscribed to this change. Although
the modification was said to be "imported" by Justice Washington's 1806 opinion in Joy v. Wirtz, 10 the alteration was articulated most authoritatively in the
factually similar, 1855 decision of the United States Supreme Court, Shields v.
Barrow. 11
In Shields plaintiff sought to rescind an agreement with six people but did
not sue four of them, because their presence in the litigation would have destroyed diversity jurisdiction. The Supreme Court refused to permit the case to
proceed without the four individuals whose interests could have been adversely
affected. The Court apparently premised its determination on the distinction
between "necessary" parties, who should be sued and "indispensable" parties,
such as the four absentees, who must be joined and in whose absence it would be
unfair to continue:
Persons having an interest in the controversy, and who ought to be
made parties, in order that the court may act on that rule which re5. See Hazard, Indispensable Party: The Historical Origin of a Procedural Phantom, 61
CoLUM. L. REV. 1254, 1255-58 (1961); Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966
Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REv. 356, 358-59 (1967);
Reed, Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions, 55 MICH. L. REv. 327, 331 (1957).
6. "Equity .•• tolerated the absence of an interested person when it was shown that joinder
was impossible, or impractical, or involved undue complication ... because the chancellors apprehended that doing an incomplete job in a litigation would often be better than doing no job at all."
Kaplan, supra note 5, at 359; see Hazard, supra note 5, at 1268-75.
7. "Under the influence of the heady slogans of 'doing perfect justice' and 'making complete
decrees,' " the chancery premised its determinations on abstract categorizations of absentees as "indispensable." Kaplan, supra note 5, at 359; see Hazard, supra note 5, at 1268-75.
8. 2 Bro. C.C. 276, 29 Eng. Rep. 151 (Ch. 1787).
9. Fell became the leading case and was read inflexibly for the proposition that litigation must
be dismissed whenever any absentee who was "indispensable" could not be joined. See Hazard,
supra note 5, at 1274-77.
IO. 13 F. Cas. 1172 (C.C.D. Pa. 1806) (No. 7553-54); cf Hazard, supra note 5, at 1278-82
(analysis of Joy); Kaplan, supra note 5, at 359 {discussing this "importation").
11. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130 (1855).
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quires it to decide on, and finally determine the entire controversy, and
do complete justice, by adjusting all the rights involved in it ... are
commonly termed necessary parties; but if their interests are separable
from those of the parties before the court, so that the court can proceed to a decree, and do complete and final justice, without affecting
other persons not before the court, [they] are not indispensable parties .... Persons who not only have an interest in the controversy, but
an interest of such a nature that a final decree cannot be made without
either affecting that interest, or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final termination may be wholly inconsistent with equity
and good conscience [are indispensable parties]. 12
The Court failed to mention specifically all the relevant factors that led it to
resolve the party joinder question by ordering dismissal of plaintiff's claim.
Therefore, although the Court might have resolved the joinder issue properly,
that conclusion can be reached only by making certain assumptions about the
reasoning the Court employed or by considering particulars not stated in
Shields, such as the practical implications of dismissal. 13
The Shields Court's classification of parties as necessary or indispensable,
however, was most important to the development of party joinder ideas over the
subsequent century. That categorization underlies what commentators have
characterized as a "jurisprudence oflabels" 14 or the "classification of cases by a
kind of sloganeering process in which important factual detail was overlooked." 15 Judges, assessing circumstances in which absentee joinder was infeasible, did not evaluate thoroughly, much less pragmatically or flexibly, all
considerations present in specific situations. 16 Rather, courts rigidly relied on
concepts of "separability" or "jointness." Thus, judges assigned the conclusory
label "indispensable" to absentees-such as the four unjoined original endorsers
of the note in Shields-whose interests were considered ''joint" or "common" or
"united in interest" with entities in the litigation. If an absent party were held to
be indispensable, the court dismissed the case. 17
2. Original Federal Rule 19
Adopted in 1938, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 was intended to facilitate more comprehensive packaging of suits and to minimize multiple litigation
12. Id. at 139.
13. Thus, although "the Court left unmentioned that the plaintiff Barrow might possibly lack
access to any court in which all parties could be joined, so that dismissal of the instant suit might
leave him remediless,'' Kaplan, supra note 5, at 362, Professor Kaplan has noted that other considerations not stated in Shields might indicate the Court resolved the joinder issue properly, id.
14. See c. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS§ 70, at 458 (4th ed. 1983); see also Reed,
supra note 5, at 329 (cases revealed "ready reliance on labels [and] thoughtless reiteration-instead
of a critical reexamination-of the basic principles of required joinder").
15. Kaplan, supra note 5, at 362.
16. For helpful descriptions of judicial treatment, see Freer, Rethinking Compulsory Joinder: A
Proposal To Restructure Federal Rule 19, 60 N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 1061, 1075-76 (1985); Kaplan, supra
note 5, at 362. The advisability of proceeding was an important consideration that judges neglected.
17. "It fostered an inward analysis of the nature of the rights asserted, rather than an outward
assessment of the pros and cons of continuing with the particular case in the face of some incompleteness of the dramatis personae." Kaplan, supra note 5, at 362.
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"by abandoning the mystical, inefficient, and narrower old tests in favor of a
simpler and broader inquiry ... along transactional lines." 18 But the rule failed
to affect significantly the deficiencies in judicial treatment of the party joinder
issue that had developed over the preceding 100 years. 19 The rule employed the
familiar concepts of "necessary" and "indispensable" parties as well as ''joint
interests." This use of traditional terminology directed the courts to focus on
the abstract or technical nature of absentees' interests while diverting judicial
attention from practical concerns, like hardships imposed on litigants and absentees, that should have been considered more important.20 Contemporaneous
with the adoption of original Federal Rule 19, the United States Supreme Court
resolved several labor law issues that became important in the development of
the public rights exception.
B.

The Public Rights Doctrine, National Licorice Company v. NLRB, and
the Public Rights Exception

During the late 1930s and early 1940s, the Supreme Court subscribed to a
"public rights doctrine" that generally enshrined the government, rather than
private entities like labor unions, as the appropriate agent for vindicating certain
"rights" found in labor legislation. 21 National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 22 decided
in 1940, was one in the line of cases espousing this doctrine. This decision was
destined to serve as a primary source of the public rights exception.23
In National Licorice the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) had
found an employer's procurement of labor contracts with employees to be an
unfair labor practice and effectively rendered those contracts unenforceable.
The NLRB made its decision in an administrative proceeding in which the employees were not parties. The employer then challenged the NLRB's determination on the basis that the Board had failed to join the employees whose contracts
were in question. The Supreme Court rejected the employer's contention that
the employees were "indispensable parties" who were required to be joined in
the administrative proceeding, partly because the NLRB was vindicating statutorily prescribed public rights:
18. Freer, supra note 16, at 1065-67; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 19, 308 U.S. 687 (1938). For discussions and criticisms of the 1938 rule, see Freer, supra note 16, at 1065-67, 1075-76; Kaplan, supra
note 5, at 363-64.
19. Widespread agreement exists on this point. See, e.g., Freer, supra note 16, at 1076; Hazard,
supra note 5, at 1287-89; Kaplan, supra note 5, at 363-64.
20. See FED. R. C1v. P. 19, Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. 89, 90 (1966) [hereinafter Rule
19 Advisory Comm. Note]; Kaplan, supra note 5, at 363-64.
21. See Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal
Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 310-18 (1978); see also Jaffe, The Public Right
Dogma in Labor Board Cases, 59 HARV. L. REV. 720 (1946) (contemporaneous account of the doctrine's development).
22. 309 U.S. 350 (1940).
23. The public rights doctrine's continuing application has not been restricted to the labor area.
See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67-72 (1982); Luneburg & Nordenberg, Specially
Qualified Juries and Expert Nonjury Tribunals: Alternatives for Coping with the Complexities of
Modern Civil Litigation, 67 VA. L. REv. 887, 955-69 (1981).
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In a proceeding so narrowly restricted to the protection and enforcement of public rights, there is little scope or need for the traditional rules governing the joinder of parties in litigation determining
private rights ....
Here the right asserted by the Board is not one arising upon or
derived from the contracts between petitioner and its employees. The
Board asserts a public right vested in it as a public body, charged in the
public interest with the duty of preventing unfair labor practices.2 4
Considerations other than NLRB vindication of public rights, however,
were as important to Justice Stone's resolution of National Licorice. Thus,
although the Court's determination that the absent employees were "not indispensable parties for purposes of the Board's order" was premised partially on
agency pursuit of public rights, the finding was based as much on the order's
ineffectiveness to "determine any private rights of the employees [who remained]
free to assert such legal rights as they may have acquired under their contracts. "25 Emphasis on the separate, rather than the public, nature of the rights
at issue as well as concern for absentees permeate the opinion. For example, the
Court observed that joinder might be unnecessary "in private litigation where
the rights asserted arise independently of any contract" that a defendant may
have with an absentee. The Court considered contractual rights "distinct and
separate, so that the Court [could], in a proper case, proceed to judgment without joining other parties to the contract, shaping its decree in such manner as to
preserve the rights of those not before it." 26 The Court expressed solicitude for
absentees by emphasizing the difference between the statutory public rights that
were adjudicated and the absentees' private contractual rights. These rights (1)
were independent and not litigated, (2) should be protected assiduously by the
court in fashioning relief, and (3) could be pursued separately by absentees. 27
The Court in National Licorice did not, however, explicitly espouse a "public rights exception." Indeed, its resolution of the case comported with prior
understandings of party joinder, captured in the federal rule adopted two years
earlier. For instance, the concepts of "separable" interests held by "necessary"
parties, in contrast to "joint" or "common" interests held by "indispensable"
parties, were compatible with, and even implemented, those previous understandings. 28 The ruling in National Licorice apparently was premised as much
on the independent character of the rights in question and fidelity to pre-existing
party joinder ideas, as on the public nature of those rights. Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court did mention vindication of public rights, and judges subsequently read the decision as enunciating a public rights exception.
24. National Licorice, 309 U.S. at 363-64.
25. Id. at 366.
26. Id. at 363.
27. Id. The Court also appreciated the absurdity of permitting statutory violators to avoid the
law by inducing absentees not to require compliance with it or by conditioning compliance on absentee presence. See id. at 364.
28. See supra text accompanying notes 5-20.
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C. Developments from 1940 to 1970
In the three decades following National Licorice no federal judge expressly
declared that the Court had recognized a public rights exception to party joinder. To be sure, National Licorice was cited, but only rarely for the proposition
that governmental agencies vindicating public rights need not join entities like
the employee-signatories of the labor contracts in National Licorice. 29 By the
end of this period, however, there were two developments important to the creation of the public rights exception.
1. Amendment of Rule 19
During the mid-1960s the original rule 19 was revised, a process that
culminated in significant restructuring of the rule in 1966.30 The changes, made
primarily at the instigation of commentators, 31 were said to be necessitated by
experience indicating that the 1938 rule was poorly phrased and failed to state
clearly the correct bases for deciding the party joinder question. 32 Writers suggested that the "use of 'indispensable' and 'joint interest' in the context of original rule 19 directed attention to the technical or abstract character of the rights
or obligations of the persons whose joinder was in question, and correspondingly
distracted attention from the pragmatic considerations which should be controlling."33 Concomitantly, the rule failed to alert judges to the importance of flexible, practical analysis and to prescribe affirmatively those factors pertinent to
determining if the case should continue or be dismissed when absentee joinder
was not feasible. 34 "In some instances courts did not undertake the relevant
inquiry [while in others] there was undue preoccupation with abstract classifications of rights or obligations, as against consideration of the particular consequences of proceeding with the action and the ways by which these
consequences might be ameliorated." 35
The proponents of revision and the drafters of the 1966 amendment ac29. See, e.g., NLRB v. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 124 F.2d 50, 54-55 (6th Cir. 1941), aff'd,
318 U.S. 9 (1943); cf. Pepsico, Inc. v. FTC, 472 F.2d 179, 187-90 (2d Cir. 1972) (post-1970 mention
of public rights doctrine), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 876 (1973).
30. See Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 88-94; 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
supra note 2, §§ 1601-26; Kaplan, supra note 5. The Advisory Committee Note bears the imprint of
Professor Kaplan, the reporter for the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, and is a valuable source
for the drafters' views of the revisions. See also 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra, § 1601, at 13
(noting the weight courts accord the Advisory Note). See generally Cohn, The New Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 1204 (1966) (contemporaneous commentary on amended rule 19).
31. E.g., Hazard, supra note 5; Reed, supra note 5. But see Fink, Indispensable Parties and the
Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule 19, 74 YALE L.J. 403 (1965) (criticizing the proposed
amendment).
32. See Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 90; cf infra text accompanying note
36 (even advocates of change admitted 1938 rule did not seem to have been "responsible for much
erroneous judicial resolution of the party joinder issue").
33. Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 90; see 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra
note 2, § 1601, at 8-9; Kaplan, supra note 5, at 363-64.
34. The 1938 version failed to "state affirmatively what factors were relevant in deciding
whether the action should proceed or be dismissed when joinder of interested persons was infeasible." Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 90-91; see Freer, supra note 16, at 1076;
Kaplan, supra note 5, at 363-64.
35. Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 91.
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knowledged that these problems apparently were not responsible for much erroneous judicial resolution of the party joinder issue. 36 Indeed, most courts
appeared to have resolved the joinder question properly by correctly balancing
the pertinent factors in classifying absentees as indispensable or necessary. 37
But it was difficult to ascertain precisely how these satisfactory decisions had
been made, "since the courts, in tune with the rule, had not asked the really
cogent questions and hence failed to bring out the facts and their legal implications, by reference to which the results could be intelligently criticized." 38
Moreover, some judges had improperly resolved the joinder issue or used categorical, formulaic, or rigid approaches. 39 Thus, the rulemakers were concerned
more with altering judicial reasoning processes than with case results40 or existing joinder principles.4t
The amendment first designated entities that should be joined for just adjudication and required explicit consideration of the interests served by joinder.42
When absentees were found to have an interest in the pending litigation-an
interest that could be jeopardized by its resolution without them-or when the
entities' absence could have injured parties to the case, courts were to determine
whether joinder was feasible, considering subject matter jurisdiction, venue, and
service of process. 43 If joinder were feasible, judges were to order it.44 When
joinder was infeasible, the rule provided guidance for determining whether in
"equity and good conscience" the plaintiff's suit should be dismissed or proceed
without the absentees. 45 A list of factors implicating four pertinent interests
informed this determination: (1) the plaintiff's need for a forum in which to
litigate; (2) absentees' concern in minimizing prejudice to their interests if the
case continued without them; (3) defendant's desire to avoid multiple actions,
36. See Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 91; 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
supra note 2, § 1601, at 11-12; Kaplan, supra note 5, at 366-67.
37. "A proper balancing of the values and interests could take place in the process of assigning
persons to the categories mentioned, and no doubt this often occurred." Kaplan, supra note 5, at
363.
38. Kaplan, supra note 5, at 367.
39. "The existing rule, it was said ... had not resulted in any spate of wrong or hurtful decisions. . • . But scholarly examination of the cases had turned up errors in no negligible quantity."
Kaplan, supra note 5, at 366-67.
40. See Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 91; 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
supra note 2, § 1601, at 11-12, 14-16, § 1608, at 92-93; Kaplan, supra note 5, at 367.
41. See Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 116 n.12 (1968); 7
c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 1601, at 11-12, 14-16.
42. Amended rule 19 is reproduced in full supra note 2 and analyzed comprehensively infra
text accompanying notes 124-255. Considerations pertinent to determining whether entities should
be joined appear in subsections 19(a)(l), (a)(2) (i) and (ii). Judges and writers still employ the term
"necessary." See, e.g., Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803 F. 2d 466, 468 (9th Cir. 1986);
F. JAMES & G. HAzARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE§ 10.11, at 530 (3d ed. 1985). But "Rule 19's title
phrase 'needed for [a] just adjudication' was substituted for 'necessary' in an effort to avoid the
talismanic significance which that term had acquired." Freer, supra note 16, at 1076 n. 77. Thus,
this Article avoids use of the term "necessary."
43. These "joinder limitations" appear in the initial and concluding sentences of rule 19(a). See
supra note 2 (full text of rule 19).
44. The entity "shall be joined as a party in the action." FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a).
45. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b); see also Kaplan, supra note 5, at 365 (discussing rule 19(b)); 7 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 1608 (discussing rule 19(b)).
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inconsistent judgments, or sole responsibility for liability another should share;
and (4) the public's interest in thorough, consistent, and efficient resolution of
disputes. 46
The rulemakers emphasized the need to protect relevant interests, evincing
particular solicitude for plaintiffs and absentees. 47 The drafters also sought to
encourage case-by-case, practical decisionmaking with a balancing of pertinent
considerations when appropriate. 48 In the 1968 case of Provident Tradesmens
Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 49 the Supreme Court placed its imprimatur on
the amendment, approving the propositions above and giving the new rule its
definitive judicial gloss.
2.

Public Rights Litigation

About the time of the rule's amendment, there began to coalesce numerous
closely related developments that altered significantly the character of much federal civil litigation. 50 These developments engendered a new party joinder problem that the rulemakers apparently did not anticipate. 51
One important development was the changed perception, and probably the
reality, of much administrative decisionmaking. 52 At the time of the New Deal
and for several decades thereafter, numerous public officials and commentators
46. See FED. R. C1v. P. 19(b). The characterization of the four factors in the text is drawn
from the Supreme Court's formulation in Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390
U.S. 102, 110-12 (1968).
47. See Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 89-94; Provident Tradesmens Bank &
Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 109-12 (1968); Cohn, supra note 30, at 1210; see also infra text
accompanying note 197 (discussing the relative import of plaintiffs' and absentees' interests).
48. See Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 89-94; Provident Tradesmens, 390
U.S. at 116-19.
49. 390 U.S. 102 (1968).
50. Thorough analysis of all the developments is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, this
Article offers an account that examines themes most important to recognition of the public rights
exception by drawing on numerous sources that have competently chronicled many of the developments. These sources include: CoUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAw, BALANCING THE SCALES OF
JUSTICE (1976) [hereinafter BALANCING THE SCALES]; B. WEISBROD, PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: AN
EcONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (1978) [hereinafter PUBLIC INTEREST LAW]; Rabin,
Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REv. 1189 (1986) [hereinafter Rabin II];
Rabin, Lawyers/or Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 207 (1976)
[hereinafter Rabin I]; Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1667 (1975).
51. Rule 19, its Advisory Committee's Note, and Professor Kaplan's writing evince no cognizance of the problem. The rule seems to contemplate traditional two-party litigation, typified by the
Supreme Court's decision in Provident Tradesmens. These considerations comport with many developments discussed below that were nascent when the amendment was adopted. Thus, although the
exception appears to constitute a natural response to an unanticipated problem, rule 19's "liberalization" may have obviated the need for the exception. Telephone interview with Professor Richard
Marcus, University of Illinois, College of Law (July 18, 1986) (recognizing that Kaplan was proponent of rules' "liberal ethos" favoring disposition of cases on merits); see also United States v.
Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 983-84 (2d Cir. 1984) (Rule 24 contemplated traditional private litigation); Freer, supra note 16, at 1065-66 ("The common law and early civil procedure code rules were based essentially on a two-party model of litigation, a model that became
obsolete in a more mobile and complex society.").
52. Sees. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note l; J. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY
(1978); Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393 (1981); Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 507 (1985); Rabin II, supra note 50,
passim; Stewart, supra note 50, passim.
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believed that the best agency decisions would result from trusting administrative
expertise and that courts therefore should defer to agency expertise. 53 By the
1960s, however, practical experience had undermined this New Deal faith and
even created doubt about the possibility of objectively identifying the "public
interest," which many agencies were commanded by statute to implement in
their decisionmaking. 54 Furthermore, critics found that the exercise of administrative expertise alone did not guarantee the best substantive governmental deciskms. A number of ageney determinations required the balancing of numerous
competing factors; some of these determinations involved policy choices such as
wealth redistribution. Governmental decisions were affected by extra-agency influences, such as political pressure. Little of this decisionmaking, however, was
amenable to resolution by "experts," so that judicial deference to agencies premised on expertise made less sense. 55 Commercial concerns, for example, contended that agency decisionmaking was inaccurate, ineffective, and expensive;
consumer organizations argued that agencies were biased toward industry. All
these considerations contributed to the widespread perception that agencies had
"failed" to accomplish the missions Congress assigned them. 56
As a result of this new criticism, much administrative decisionmaking be53. New Deal Congresses delegated "sweeping powers to a host of new agencies under legislative directives cast in the most general terms," so that agencies had broad discretion to adjudicate
and legislate. Stewart, supra note 50, at 1677. Defenders of this legislation justified broad discretionary delegations, agencies' combination of functions, decreased procedural formalities, and deferential
judicial review by arguing that the economy's salvation demanded administrative controls involving
expertise, mixed powers, and discretionary management like that used by business. They also asserted that successful administration was "incompatible with legalistic formalities and [implicated]
technical issues beyond the undertaking oflay judges." S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note 1, at
28; see Garland, supra note 52, at 577-78.
54. In 1975 Professor Stewart stated:
Experience has withered this faith. To the extent that belief in an objective "public interest" remains, the agencies are accused of subverting it in favor of the private interests of
regulated and client firms. [We] now doubt the very existence of an ascertainable "national
welfare" as a meaningful guide to administrative decision. Exposure on the one hand to
the complexities of a managed economy in a welfare state, and on the other to the corrosive
seduction of welfare economics and pluralist political analysis, has sapped faith in the existence of an objective basis for social choice.
Stewart, supra note 50, at 1682-83 (citations omitted); accord, Rabin II, supra note 50, at 1266-72,
1281-1306. Section 307(a) of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 307(a)(1970), instructs the
Federal Communications Commission to grant licenses in the "public convenience, interest, or necessity." Id.
55. For example, the populace "lost faith in the notion that technical experts could obtain
value-free results," Garland, supra note 52, at 577, or that they could protect the "public interest"
against regulated interests, see Stewart, supra note 50, at 1682-83.
56. For example, economists and some business representatives assert that regulatory programs
characteristically benefit strategically placed, well-organized interests at the public's expense while
the mechanisms administrators use to "alter market behavior-such as regulatory prohibitions, licensing, and other legalistic controls-are inappropriate, clumsy, and excessively costly." Correspondingly, consumer advocates like Ralph Nader have criticized traditional regulatory agencies for
being "captured" by the industries they ostensibly regulated and for failing to protect vigorously
"consumers, workers, and other supposed beneficiaries of regulatory programs." S. BREYER & R.
STEWART, supra note 1, at 36. For helpful analyses of changed perceptions of administrative decisionmaking, see Garland, supra note 52, at 577-78; Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Administration, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1183, 1186-90 (1973); Rabin II, supra note 50, at 1266-72, 1281-1306; Stewart, supra
note 50, at 1671-88.
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gan to be viewed as an essentially legislative process in which all interests57 affected by agency judgments were considered and weighed in reaching the correct
determination. 58 The difficulty with this perspective on the decisional process
was that regulated entities submitted most of the input on which agencies relied
in making decisions. Therefore, certain advocates of reform and critics of
agency decisionmaking recommended the expansion of opportunities for
nonindustry participation in administrative proceedings and courtroom litigation. Thus, judges eased constraints on citizen involvement in agency and judicial proceedings. 59 Moreover, courts scrutinized administrative decisional
processes to determine whether individuals and entities affected were adequately
represented, whether agencies properly considered and balanced the ideas they
expressed, and whether the conclusions reached were rational. 60
The rise of this "interest representation" model of the administrative process and judicial review of agency decisions was inextricably linked to the substantial expansion of the "public interest law movement." 61 That movement,
which originated in the areas of civil rights and civil liberties advocacy, sought
to vindicate in the administrative sphere and in the courts rights and interests of
large, unorganized groups of people, such as the poor, consumers, disadvantaged
minorities, and others who previously had been underrepresented, if represented
at all. 62
57. Interests considered particularly important were those previously unrepresented, such as
consumers' interests.
58. Professor Stewart has noted:
Today, the exercise of agency discretion is inevitably seen as the essentially legislative process of adjusting the competing claims of various private interests affected by agency policy. • . . Courts have asserted that agencies must consider all of the various interests
affected by their decisions as an essential predicate to "balancing all elements essential to a
just determination of the public interest."
Stewart, supra note 50, at 1683 (citing Airline Pilots Ass'n, lnt'l v. CAB, 475 F.2d 900, 905 (D.C.
Cir. 1973)). For helpful analyses of these new perspectives on administrative decisionmaking, see id.
at 1711-59; Garland, supra note 52, at 577-81; Rabin II, supra note 50, at 1296-99.
59. See, e.g., Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 100006 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 615-17 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966); see also Gellhom, Public Participation in Administrative
Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359, 362-69 (1972) (analyzing case law development easing constraints);
Stewart, supra note 50, at 1723-56 (analyzing case law development easing contraints).
60. The "model that emerged looked upon judicial review ... as a means of fostering a substitute political process in which all affected interests would be represented and considered." Garland,
supra note 52, at 578; see, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35-36 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); Airline Pilots Ass'n, lnt'I v. CAB, 475 F.2d 900, 905 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 972 (1975). For analyses of the model and the case law developing it, see
Garland, supra note 52, at 577-81; Rabin II, supra note 50, at 1300-15; Stewart, supra note 50, at
1756-60, 1781-89.
61. See BALANCING THE SCALES, supra note 50, passim;
LAZARUS, THE GENTEEL POPULISTS, passim (1974); PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 50, passim; Rabin I, supra note 50, at 224.
Models are a matter of ongoing debate. See, e.g., Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEX. L. REV. 207, passim (1984); Rabin II, supra note 50, at 1311-15; Sunstein, Factions,
Self-Interest and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA. L. REv. 271, 281-92 (1986). For helpful syntheses of these models, see Cass, Models ofAdministrative Action, 72 VA. L. REv. 363, passim
(1986); Shapiro, Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage, 92 YALE L.J. 1487, 1495-99 (1983).
62. See BALANCING THE SCALES, supra note 50, passim; PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note
50, passim; S. LAZARUS, supra note 61, passim; Rabin I, supra note 50, passim; Stewart, supra note
50, at 1711-16, 1748-70. For discussion of"public interest," or "public law," litigation, see Chayes,
Public Law Litigation, supra note 1, passim; Chayes, Foreward, supra note 1, passim; Rabin I, supra
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Closely related to these developments was much legislative activity. 63 Between 1962 and 1980 Congress passed much "social legislation," said to institute
"social regulation," in fields such as race, gender, and employment discrimination, and environmental, consumer, and workplace protection. 64 Many of the
statutes vested considerable discretion in administrative agencies to implement
broad mandates. But Congress also attempted to constrain exercise of that discretion. For example, legislation required agencies to solicit and consider public
input and provided for administrative participation and citizen suits by the legislation's intended beneficiaries. 6 5
Thus, "public interest group" plaintiffs pursued an increasing share of federal civil litigation on behalf of substantial, unorganized collections of individuals to vindicate "public rights" allegedly violated by administrative
decisionmakers. 66 Moreover, some of these suits implicated amended rule 19
concerns by proceeding in the absence of entities whose interests could have
been adversely affected. In 1971 a new party joinder problem arose, when the
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), a national environmental "public
interest group," sought to vindicate public rights under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The NRDC sought to prevent the Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA) from buying coal under contracts with unjoined private producers until TVA satisfied NEPA's requirements.
D.

Natural Resources Defense Council v. Tennessee Valley Authority

The pivotal opinion, Natural Resources Defense Council v. Tennessee Valley
Authority (NRDC), 67 harkens back to, and honors much in, National Licorice.
note 50, at 228-35. For discussion of"early law reform efforts" and their links to modern efforts, see
BALANCING THE SCALES, supra note 50, at ch. 1; Houck, With Charity For All, 93 YALE L.J. 1415,
1438-43 (1984); Rabin I, supra note 50, at 209-24.
63. See Rabin II, supra note 50, at 1278-95. Professor Rabin has criticized many writers for
undifferentiated treatment of the activity, and he has offered analysis at once more thorough and
refined. See Rabin I, supra note 50, at 242 (noting that much environmental legislation's passage
was contemporaneous with the rise of public interest law). For discussion of "social regulation," see
Vogel, The "New" Social Regulation in Historical and Comparative Perspective, in REGULATION IN
PERSPECTIVE: HISTORICAL EssAYS 155 (T. Mccraw ed. 1981); Lilley & Miller, The New "Social
Regulation," 47 PUB. INTEREST 49 (Spring 1977).
64. Classic examples of such legislation are: the National Environmental Policy Act, Pub. L.
No. 91-190, § 102, 83 Stat. 852, 854 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-35 (1977)); the
Occupational Safety and Health Act, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590-1620 (1970) (codified at 29
U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1985)); and the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat.
103-13 (1972) (codified at 42 u.s.c. §§ 2000e-e17 (1981)). Cf R. LITAN & w. NORDHAUS, REFORMING FEDERAL REGULATION 44 (1983) (noting 40 major statutes that have been passed).
65. Helpful examples of Congressional provision for administrative participation and citizen
suits appear in the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1702, 1712, & 1739
(1986) and the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1986). See also 15 U.S.C. § 57a(h) (1973)
(agency funding of citizen participation); Tobias, Of Public Funds and Public Participation: Resolving the Issue ofAgency Authority to Reimburse Public Participants in Administrative Proceedings, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 906 (1982) (discussing agency funding of citizen participation in administrative
proceedings).
66. For discussion of this phenomenon and closely related developments, see sources cited
supra notes 50 & 62; Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979); see also Rabin II, supra note 50, at 1295-1315 (discussing specific litigation
pursued by public interest group plaintiffs).
67. 340 F. Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 459 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1972).
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It also integrates numerous legal and policy developments, including changed
perspectives on administrative decisiorunaking, that occurred during the intervening period. 68 Most significant, however, NRDC provided a foundation for
creation of the public rights exception.
In NRDC the Natural Resources Defense Council sought to compel TVA's
compliance with the dictates of NEPA before the agency purchased coal under
contracts with private producers. These producers were not sued because it was
impossible to serve them. NRDC alleged that NEPA required TVA to prepare
an environmental impact statement on the envirorunental consequences of buying strip-mined coal to be burned in the agency's power plants. The governmental defendant, TVA, asked that NRDC's case be dismissed for failure to join as
"indispensable parties" the private producers who had contracted to sell the
agency coal. The court refused to require joinder, partly because NRDC was
vindicating statutorily provided public rights, independent of any private contractual interests that the producers were free to pursue:
The instant action, like that in National Licorice, seeks to enforce
an essentially public right . . . .
Plaintiffs do not seek to abrogate the contracts, but to restrain
defendants from purchasing coal under them "until such time as the
requirements of the National Envirorunental Policy Act of 1969 are
met." If this relief were granted, the private contractors would still be
able to assert their rights against TVA .... 69
Thus, NRDC is similar to National Licorice. Both courts would have permitted
plaintiffs to vindicate public rights without joining absentees that had private
contractual interests separate from those rights-interests that the absentees remained free to pursue. NRDC, however, differs in certain respects from National Licorice: the NRDC court allowed a "public interest group" to vindicate
public rights in new "social legislation" against a government agency. The
NRDC court also employed an amended rule 19(b) analysis that explicitly
treated National Licorice under only the subdivision's first stated factor: the
extent of prejudice to absentees if the litigation proceeds without them. 70 These
distinctions, although technical, were predictable. For example, the "party
transformation"-which permitted an essentially private entity to serve as the
plaintiff for vindicating public rights against a government defendant, rather
than allowing the government to pursue public rights against private partiescomported with numerous earlier developments, such as liberalized standing accorded public interest groups. 71 Correspondingly, the emphasis on rule 19 was
compelled by its 1966 revision. 72 Nevertheless, theNRDC court, by "moderniz68. For discussion of these developments, see supra text accompanying notes 50-66.
69. NRDC, 340 F. Supp. at 408 (quoting the complaint).
70. Id. at 407-08.
71. See supra text accompanying note 59; see also NRDC, 340 F. Supp. at 408 (citing landmark
standing and environmental cases); Luneburg & Nordenberg, supra note 23, at 963·69 (suggesting
that private entities might vindicate public rights).
72. The NRDC court could not ignore rule 19. Judges who recognize the public rights exception, however, arguably are ignoring rule 19 and, thus, raise the question whether they can create
true exceptions to the Federal Rules. See a/so Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176 (1974)
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ing" National Licorice and mentioning the public nature of the rights being asserted, afforded additional support for recognition of the public rights exception.
In sum, neither National Licorice nor NRDC expressly espoused a "public
rights exception" to party joinder. The independent character of the rights
under consideration and fidelity to applicable party joinder concepts, whether
grounded in common law, equity, or the applicable Federal Rule, were significant for both decisions. 73
It is on these points, however, that judges subsequently broke with these
two prior cases, notwithstanding liberal citation to them, and created the "public rights exception."·74 Thus, although numerous federal courts have seized on
National Licorice and NRDC to support recognition of a public rights exception,
this reliance seems misplaced. Furthermore, none of these courts has clearly
enunciated, assessed, or justified the exception. It is important, therefore, to
analyze the public rights exception as articulated; this analysis will enhance understanding of problems the exception engenders and the party joinder issue it
addresses. This evaluation will also suggest approaches for treating that
question.
II. JUDICIAL ARTICULATION OF THE PUBLIC RIGHTS EXCEPTION

A. Description of the Cases
Ten district court judges have explicitly recognized the "public rights exception. " 75 As might be expected, seven sit either in the District of Columbia or
the Ninth Circuit; most federal agencies "reside" in the District of Columbia,
and much public land is located in the Ninth Circuit. Although neither circuit
has expressly applied the public rights exception, both are currently considering
recognition, and the Second and Eleventh Circuits have explicitly applied it. 76
(federal judiciary must follow unambiguous requirements of federal rules). For helpful discussion of
the rules' purpose, construction, status and validity, rulemaking authority, and the weight of Advisory Committee recommendations, see 4 c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL §§ 1029-30 (1969); 7 c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 1601, at 13.
73. See National Licorice, 309 U.S. at 362-67; NRDC, 340 F. Supp. at 407-08.
74. Judges enunciated this exception in most cases decided in the 1970s and in a number of
cases since then. These cases are cited infra notes 75-76 and analyzed infra text accompanying notes
77-123.
75. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609, 1613-14 (D.D.C.
1985) (mem.), ajf'd on rehearing, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1082, 1084-86 (D.D.C. 1986) (mem.), appeal
filed, Nos. 86-5239, 86-5240 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel, No. J 85-009
Civ. 2-3 (D. Alaska July 24, 1985), aff'd on other grounds, 803 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1986); Sierra Club
v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 324-25 (E.D. Cal. 1985); Louisiana v. Lee, 596 F. Supp. 645, 651 (E.D.
La. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 758 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1985), cert denied., 106 S. Ct. 1259
(1986); NAACP v. Donovan, 558 F. Supp. 218, 223 (D.D.C. 1982); Swomley v. Watt, 526 F. Supp.
1271, 1273 (D.D.C. 1981); Dintino v. Dorsey, 91 F.R.D. 280, 283 (E.D. Pa. 1981); NRDC v. Berklund, 458 F. Supp. 925, 933 (D.D.C. 1978), ajf'd, 609 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam);
National Audubon Soc'y v. Kleppe, C.A. No. 76-0943, at 9 (D.D.C. Nov. 11, 1976), modified on
other grounds, National Audubon Soc'y v. Watt, 678 F.2d 299 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Sansom Comm. v.
Lynn, 366 F. Supp. 1271, 1281 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
76. The District of Columbia Circuit case is National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) 1609, 1612-14 (D.D.C. 1985) (mem.), ajf'd on rehearing, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1082,
1084-86 (D.D.C. 1986) (mem.), appeal filed, Nos. 86-5239, 86-5240 (D.C. Cir. 1986); while the
Ninth Circuit case is Conner v. Burford, 605 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mont. 1985), appeal filed, No. 85-
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Litigation in this area has implicated a variety of rights and issues. National public interest organizations, concerned with protection and preservation
of natural resources, have brought four cases against the United States Department of the Interior asserting public rights under public lands legislation or
NEPA. The successful vindication of public rights in these suits could have
prejudiced absentees by adversely affecting some interest, such as leaseholds,
that the absentees claimed in the public lands. 77 In similar litigation the American Civil Liberties Union challenged on first amendment grounds Interior Department issuance to a religious organization of a permit for use of public
lands. 78 Three suits sought to compel compliance with the requirements of
NEPA when the Interior Department, the Army Corps of Engineers, and the
Department of Housing and Urban Development proposed to undertake "major
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 79
Two cases questioned the constitutionality of tenant eviction procedures, 80 and
two others involved employment issues affecting farm workers and correctional
officers. 81
An important problem with judicial articulation of the public rights exception is that the courts have applied it in varied factual circumstances that are
difficult to generalize. Moreover, courts have invoked the exception in the context of a federal rule that is very difficult to apply and they have failed to explain
clearly the exception's relationship to that rule. In the basic scenario a "public
3935 (9th Cir. argued July 11, 1986). Many judges cite the circuit court opinion in NRDC v. Berklund, 609 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1979), as affirming the holding in NRDC v. Berklund, 458 F. Supp.
925, 933 (D.D.C. 1978), but the exception is not expressly mentioned in the circuit court opinion.
The Second and Eleventh Circuit cases are Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs.,
520 F.2d 420, 424 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976), and Jeffries v. Georgia Residential Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919, 928-29 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 971 (1982). In a recent case
the District of Columbia District Court's "review of the interests identified by Rule 19(b)" led to the
conclusion absentees were not indispensable, so that it "need not determine whether [the case fell]
within the 'public rights' exception." Coalition on Sensible Transp., Inc. v. Dole, 631 F. Supp. 1382,
1387 & n.4 (D.D.C. 1986). The Author also found no decision rejecting the exception, although this
is not surprising, given the many ways to avoid it. But a panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, reviewing a trial court's decision that "the 'public interest' exception to Rule 19 applied,"
stated it could "affirm on any basis supported in the record" and concluded that the absentees did
"not satisfy the requirements for a 'necessary party' under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)." Northern Alaska
Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466, 468 (9th Cir. 1986). Some judges appear to apply, but do not
explicitly mention, the exception. See, e.g., Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 N. Cal. Counties Joint Apprenticeship & Training Comm., 662 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 917 (1982);
Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 77 F.R.D. 448 (D.D.C. 1978); Delaware v. Bender, 370 F. Supp.
1193 (D. Del. 1974).
77. See Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1986); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609, 1612-14 (D.D.C. 1985) (mem.), aff'd on
rehearing, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1082, 1084-86 (D.D.C. 1986) (mem.), appeal filed, Nos. 86-5239,
86-5240 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305 (E.D. Cal. 1985); NRDC v. Berklund, 458 F. Supp. 925 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd, 609 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
78. See Swomley v. Watt, 526 F. Supp. 1271 (D.D.C. 1981).
79. See Louisiana v. Lee, 596 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. La. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 158 F.2d
1081 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1259 (1986); Sansom Comm. v. Lynn, 366 F. Supp.
1271 (E.D. Pa. 1973). The quoted phrase in the text is NEPA's language that requires preparation
of an environmental impact statement. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1982).
80. See Jeffries v. Georgia Residential Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 971 (1982); Dintino v. Dorsey, 91 F.R.D. 280 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
81. See Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976); NAACP v. Donovan, 558 F. Supp. 218 (D.D.C. 1982).

1987]

PUBLIC RIGHTS LITIGATION AND PARTY JOINDER

761

interest litigant" sues a governmental defendant challenging agency activity but
fails to join absentees whose interests could be adversely affected by a substantive judicial determination favorable to the plaintiff. The court, presented with a
potential party joinder problem, has applied the public rights exception, allowing the plaintiff's case to proceed without requiring joinder of absentees.
This difficulty has arisen in diverse factual contexts, although a taxonomy of
situations can be described in terms of rule 19's steps.
In a few cases absentees apparently have lacked sufficient interest in the
litigation to warrant designation as parties needed for just adjudication under
rule 19(a).82 For instance, applicants seeking governmental permission to explore for natural resources on public lands have been held to lack adequate interest in the continued application of approval procedures that public interest
litigants alleged violated NEPA. 83 Of course, if absentee interest were insufficient, that determination would have obviated the necessity to reach the ancillary question whether disposition of the litigation without an absentee might "as
a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect" such an interest. 84
Although courts have not expressly depended on lack of potential absentee prejudice when cases proceeded without absentees, such reliance may have been appropriate when absentee interests were not sufficiently affected. 85
In some circumstances absentees apparently possessed enough interest in
the litigation to be considered entities needed for just adjudication. Moreover,
absentee joinder appeared feasible under rule 19(a)'s joinder limitations, pertaining to subject matter jurisdiction, venue, and service of process, principally because the absentees were located within the jurisdiction.86 For example, when a
citizens' organization sued in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania to compel Department of Housing and Urban Development compliance with two federal statutes before approving a development application, it seemed feasible to join the University of Pennsylvania, which would
82. Rule 19(a) requires that an absentee have an "interest relating to the subject of the action
and [be] so situated" that disposition without the absentee would practically prejudice that interest
or expose parties to a "substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations." FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a).
83. "The 'subject matter' of this dispute concerns NPS procedures regarding mining plan approval. Naturally, all miners are 'interested' in how stringent the requirements will be. But miners
with pending plans have no legal entitlement to any given set of procedures." Northern Alaska
Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466, 469 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp.
305, 321-24 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (owners of mineral rights have no legally protected interest in dispute
questioning Interior Secretary's decision to remove land from wilderness inventory). This premise
also may have been true of absentees in other cases, such as certain absentee landlords in Jeffries v.
Georgia Residential Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 971 (1982), and
Dintino v. Dorsey, 91 F.R.D. 280 (E.D. Pa. 1981), who may have lacked sufficient interest in the
continued applicability of tenant eviction procedures challenged as unconstitutional.
84. FED. R. C1v. P. 19(a)(2)(i). "If the interest requirement is not satisfied, we need not reach
the factors in clauses (2)(i) and (ii) [of rule 19(a)]." Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803
F.2d 466, 468 (9th Cir. 1986).
85. In these situations, absentees had sufficient interest but were insufficiently prejudiced.
86. The rule states that a "person who is subject to service of process and whosejoinder will not
deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action" or render venue improper
"shall be joined as a party in the action." FED. R. C1v. P. 19(a).
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have been adversely affected were plaintiff's request granted. 87 Similarly, when
the Sierra Club challenged in the United States District Court for Alaska the
stringency of Interior Department procedures governing issuance of permits to
work claims on Alaskan national parks, it appeared feasible to join miners who
held such permits. 88 Despite rule 19(a)'s language, which says judges shall order joinder when feasible, the judges in these cases did not order joinder. Perhaps they believed that it would have been unduly expensive for the plaintiff to
identify and serve all absentees, that the plaintiff's relief would have been jeopardized by the resulting delay, or that the presence of absentees would have
complicated the litigation. 89
In the remaining cases joinder apparently was infeasible, as the large
number and wide geographic distribution of absentees meant all the rule 19(a)
joinder limitations could not be satisfied. In those situations, judges seemed to
determine, pursuant to rule 19(b)'s "equity and good conscience" test and its
four stated factors, that it was fairer to allow the plaintiff's suit to continue
rather than to dismiss it. 90 Moreover, in a few instances courts apparently failed
to consider seriously options less drastic than continuing or dismissing, such as
notifying absentees and affording them an opportunity to enter the litigation. 91
It is important to understand, however, that judges responded identically in
87. See Sansom Comm. v. Lynn, 366 F. Supp. 1271, 1281 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
88. These were the miners who had approved plans and were not joined in Nothem Alaska
Envtl. Center v. Hodel, No. J 85-009 Civ. 2-3 (D. Alaska July 24, 1985), rather than those with
applications for plans whose joinder was at issue in the circuit court case, Northern Alaska Envtl.
Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466, 469 (9th Cir. 1986). It also appears from the facts stated in the
opinions that joinder of absentees was feasible in numerous other cases in which courts applied the
exception. See Jeffries v. Georgia Residential Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 971 (1982); Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976); Louisiana v. Lee, 596 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. La. 1984), vacated
on other grounds, 758 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1259 (1986); Dintino v.
Dorsey, 91 F.R.D. 280 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Swomley v. Watt, 526 F. Supp. 1271 (D.D.C. 1981).
89. One court offered the most explicit statement of these concerns:
Because of problems of jurisdiction and venue, plaintiff could never join all defendants in
one forum. Requiring it to bring seventeen separate lawsuits or even to combine actions
through the device of multidistrict litigation would create enormous administrative disorder and delay. Dismissal, therefore, would effectively discourage and, for all practical purposes, put an end to this litigation.
National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609, 1612-13 (D.D.C. 1985) (mem.),
a.ff'd on rehearing, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1082 (D.D.C. 1986) (mem.), appeal filed, Nos. 86-5239, 865240 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see also Coalition on Sensible Transp., Inc. v. Dole, 631 F. Supp. 1382, 138789 (D.D.C. 1986) (expressing similar concerns).
90. See Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 324-25 (E.D. Cal. 1985); NRDC v. Berklund,
458 F. Supp. 925, 933 (D.D.C. 1978), a.ff'd, 609 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam); National
Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609, 1612-14 (D.D.C. 1985) (mem.), aff'd on
re/tearing, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1082, 1084-86 (D.D.C. 1986) (mem.), appeal filed, Nos. 86-5239,
86-5240 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
91. Very few of the opinions in which courts recognized the exception specifically indicate that
such options were considered. See, e.g., NAACP v. Donovan, 558 F. Supp. 218 (D.D.C. 1982);
Swomley v. Watt, 526 F. Supp. 1271 (D.D.C. 1981). Because the facts and reasoning processes are
unclear in the cases, see infra note 94, the opinions cannot be definitively classified. Thus, some
appear above in multiple categories. Moreover, the joinder question arises in a few cases out of
unusual fact situations. For example, in one case, the federal government defendant moved to dismiss a case brought by the state for failure to join certain state agencies. See Louisiana v. Lee, 596 F.
Supp. 645 (E.D. La. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 758 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 1259 (1986).
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all of these factual circumstances; they invoked the public rights exception so
that the plaintiff's action could proceed. But very few courts explained the relationship between the exception and rule 19, or clearly and comprehensively applied that rule's requirements. Some judges even appeared to disregard rule 19's
express commands. 92 In a number of situations courts might have resolved the
joinder question correctly under rule 19, and in other instances absentees' interests ultimately were protected because they entered the case or were adequately
represented by the government.93 In some circumstances, however, the joinder
issue may have been improperly resolved. In a number of additional situations it
is impossible to determine conclusively what courts actually did.9 4
In short, judicial reliance on the public rights exception to address the difficult party joinder question presented by public rights litigation has been problematic. Courts' enunciation of that exception is analyzed more
comprehensively below.

B. Analysis of the Cases
A few judges recognizing the public rights exception have thoroughly explored the difficult issues involved.95 But some courts have treated the exception
so tersely or unclearly that its basis cannot be definitively ascertained. Nonetheless, it is possible to discern three principal ways in which the exception has been
articulated: a few judges have announced it with minimal explication; some
have relied on considerations of public policy; and others have somehow invoked
rule 19. Courts that have enunciated the exception in the second and third ways
frequently intertwined the explanations provided. 96
92. The best example is failure to order joinder of absentees when feasible as explicitly mandated by the rule. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
93. Of course, absentee entry may have been very inconvenient. Moreover, adequate representation of their interests by the government may have been merely fortuitous, given certain peculiarities of public rights litigation such as disparities between absentee and governmental interests. See
infra text accompanying notes 158-59.
94. This classification, tailored to rule 19, is only one of numerous ways to categorize the diverse factual contexts in which courts have invoked the public rights exception. Furthermore, it is
often difficult to determine all the relevant facts from terse opinions and meaningfully explain a
complex, multi-faceted procedural issue. Nonetheless, several important considerations warrant
mention. It is important to consider the players, their interests and motivations, and how deserving
their conduct is. For example, has the plaintiff failed to join absentees due to a lack of awareness of
them, because they would strategically disadvantage the plaintiff, or because their joinder would be
very expensive? Have absentees failed to enter the litigation because they were not notified, for
tactical reasons, or because they were distant from the forum? Another significant consideration
could be timing: who knew what, when did they know it, and how did they respond to the information? A third important consideration may be the options available. Were the only choices dismissal
of the plaintiff's case or proceeding without absentees? Were there less extreme possibilities, such as
the plaintiff suing in another forum or absentees entering the litigation? If there were other options,
how costly would they have been? All of these and other considerations are examined fully, infra
notes 124-255 and accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609 (D.D.C.
1985) (mem.), ajf'd on rehearing, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1082 (D.D.C. 1986) (mem.), appeal filed,
Nos. 86-5239, 86-5240 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305 (E.D. Cal. 1985).
96. Examples are cases cited infra notes 100-22. Insofar as possible, analysis of the first and
second ways of articulating the exception is separated from rule 19. Courts apparently had little
difficulty with this separation, but it is problematic, because the exception should have no existence
apart from rule 19.
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The Essentially Unadorned Exception

A few judges simply have proclaimed with little explanation that the exception exists, 97 apparently considering rule 19 inapplicable to public rights litigation. One court found irrelevant the "effect that a judgment may have on third
parties [because] the constraints of Rule 19 apply only to adjudications of 'private rights.' " 98 A second court stated, "[E]ven when a party might otherwise
be indispensable, joinder is not required where the plaintiff seeks to vindicate
public rights." 9 9
2.

Public Policy Considerations

A number of courts recognizing the public rights exception have relied on
concepts of public policy. These courts recognize that public rights litigation,
which challenges governmental activity involving constitutional, statutory, or
administrative issues, can affect many geographically dispersed entities, thereby
rendering joinder impracticable, if not impossible. 100 From these considerations
the courts reason that adherence to rule 19 could effectively preclude public
rights suits by making such claims unduly cumbersome or by denying the plaintiff a forum. 10 1
Numerous unstated assumptions apparently underlie these ideas. One may
be that litigation questioning governmental activity is intrinsically beneficial,
partly because it could increase public accountability of government officials for
their actions or it could make such activity more acceptable to the citizenry. 102
Similarly, judges apparently assume that it is important to afford plaintiffs a
"day in court" and to resolve on the merits the significant issues raised, rather
97. The opinions of these judges, and others, also include conclusory propositions. For example, one court stated that "NEPA suits have rarely included the joinder of all parties which hold
contracts, licenses, leases or other rights which might be affected." National Audubon Soc'y v.
Kleppe, C.A. No. 76-0943, at 9 (D.D.C. Nov. 11, 1976), modified on other grounds, National Audubon Soc'y v. Watt, 678 F.2d 299 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
98. Louisiana v. Lee, 596 F. Supp. 645, 651 (E.D. La. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 758 F.2d
1081 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1259 (1986).
99. Swomley v. Watt, 526 F. Supp. 1271, 1273 (D.D.C. 1981). These cases, and others, do cite
National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350 (1940), and later cases recognizing the exception. See,
e.g., Swomley v. Watt, 526 F. Supp. 1271 (D.D.C. 1981); Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel,
No. J 85-009 Civ. 2-3 (D. Alaska July 24, 1985). But the precedent does not support the propositions for which it is invoked. See supra text accompanying notes 21-29, 67-74.
100. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 324-25 (E.D. Cal. 1985); NRDC v. Berklund, 458 F. Supp. 925, 933 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd, 609 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam);
National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609, 1614 (D.D.C. 1985) (mem.).
101. See Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 324-25 (E.D. Cal. 1985); NRDC v. Berklund,
458 F. Supp. 925, 933 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd, 609 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam); National
Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609, 1614 (D.D.C. 1985) (mem.).
102. For example, in recent public rights litigation involving government accountability, the National Park Service "confessed to NEPA violations" and was "violating its own regulations concerning access to claims" when it permitted mining in Alaska's national parks. See Northern Alaska
Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466, 469 (9th Cir. 1986). For discussions of public accountability
for, and acceptability of, governmental decisions, see Cramton, The Why, Where and How ofBroade11ed Public Participation in the Administrative Process, 60 GEO. L.J. 525 (1972); Furrow, Governing
Science: Public Risks and Private Remedies, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1403, 1422-24 (1983); Sunstein,
Participation, Public Law, and Venue Reform, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 976, 986-88 (1982).
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than to dismiss potentially legitimate suits. 103 Such dismissal in turn could
shield from public scrutiny improper governmental behavior, like violation of
statutory commands governing disposition of the public lands, and permit absentees to benefit from the improper conduct. 104 Moreover, judges seem to appreciate certain practicalities of public rights litigation in the modern
administrative state. For instance, "public interest group" plaintiffs have available minimal resources for litigation, especially in contrast to governmental defendants and certain interests subject to governmental regulation.1u5 Thus, were
a court to order dismissal of such a public interest litigant's case against the
government and offer the possibility of relitigation in an alternative forum, that
public interest litigant could well be disproportionately affected by the delay,
expense, and effort entailed in pursuing the option. 106
Most of these public policy considerations, however, effectuate or implicate
concerns addressed by rule 19, especially solicitude for plaintiffs having a forum.
Other courts have articulated the exception by relying more directly on the rule.
3.

Invocation of Rule 19

Courts enunciating the exception in terms of rule 19 seem to invoke one or
more of its components. Much judicial treatment is less clear than it might be.
Courts do not expressly examine every consideration relevant to the rule or follow all of its steps, apparently making assumptions about those left unmentioned
or perhaps even ignoring them. For example, when absentees are located in the
jurisdiction, so that their joinder appears feasible under rule 19(a)'s joinder limitations, judges do not specifically explore the possibility of that joinder. When
courts explicitly apply pertinent considerations, judges fail to explain clearly
why or how the factors pertain. For instance, courts treat plaintiffs' need for a
forum in which to pursue public rights litigation as so important that it is virtually impossible for absentees' interests to be prejudiced in any way that could be
103. See Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305 (E.D. Cal. 1985); NRDC v. Berklund, 458 F.
Supp. 925 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd, 609 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiarn); National Wildlife Fed'n
v. Burford, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609 (D.D.C. 1985) (mem.). The courts thus are implementing the Federal Rules' "liberal ethos" favoring disposition of cases on the merits. See supra note 51.
104. For example, had the district court in Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel, No. J 85009 Civ. 2-3 (D. Alaska July 24, 1985), dismissed the Sierra Club's case, the NPS' violations of
NEPA and its own regulations governing mining in the national parks would not have been exposed
or remedied, while the miners would have continued to benefit from the less rigorous environmental
regulation afforded by the improper NPS conduct. See also supra note 27 (noting the National
Licorice Court's apparent appreciation of the absurdity of permitting statutory violators to elude the
law by seeking dismissal premised on failure to join absentee statutory beneficiaries).
105. See, e.g., PRACTICING LAW INsr., CoURT AWARDED FEES IN "PUBLIC INTEREST" LmGATION chs. 7, 23 (1978) (discussing public rights litigation costs); BALANCING THE SCALES, supra
note 50, at ch. 4; PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 50, at chs. 4, 18 (discussing plaintiffs' resources). See generally Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer & Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72 (1983) (discussing private litigation costs).
106. The judges who decided Coalition on Sensible Transp., Inc. v. Dole, 631 F. Supp. 1382,
1386-88 (D.D.C. 1986), and National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't Rep. Cas (BNA) 1609,
1613 (D.D.C. 1985) (mem.), evinced awareness of these and similar realities of public rights litigation. For discussions of additional realities of public rights litigation, see PUBLIC INTEREST LAW,
supra note 50, passim; Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note 1, passim; Chayes, Foreword, supra
note l, passim; Rabin I, supra note 50, passim.
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considered more significant under rule 19(b). 107
The best illustration of such unclear judicial articulation of the exception is
courts' reliance on National Licorice Co. v. NLRB 108 for the proposition that
" 'when litigation seeks the vindication of a public right, third persons who
could be adversely affected by a decision favorable to [the] plaintiff do not
thereby become indispensable parties.' " 109 As already discussed, National Licorice does not actually support this idea. 110 That decision did not rely so strongly
on the public nature of the rights in question or de-emphasize absentee
interests. 111
Even if National Licorice could be read to substantiate that proposition,
reliance on the opinion and the proposition is problematic. Judges essentially
substitute citation to a 1940 case for the comprehensive inquiry envisioned by
the 1966 amendment to rule 19. Courts should consult relevant considerations
and explain clearly judicial determinations even if they do not provide express
step-by-step explication of their treatment in opinions. 112 Rule 19 instructs
courts to find initially whether absentees have the type of interest in the litigation to be considered parties needed for just adjudication under rule 19(a). If
absentees are needed, judges then must determine whether joinder is feasible
pursuant to rule 19(a)'s joinder limitations respecting subject matter jurisdiction,
venue, and service of process. If these requirements are satisfied, courts are
commanded to order absentee joinder. When absentee joinder is found infeasible, judges must next find under rule 19(b) whether it is more equitable for the
plaintiff's action to continue or to be dismissed. This subdivision contemplates
that courts will examine first its four stated factors, especially those implicating
the plaintiff's forum needs and potential absentee prejudice, then examine additional pertinent considerations, and perhaps value and balance all the relevant
factors. Judges should also consider options less Draconian than dismissing the
plaintiff's case or proceeding without absentees, if alternatives are available.
Only after making this detailed inquiry should courts determine whether it is
more fair for the plaintiff's litigation to be dismissed or to continue. Dismissal is
107. Indeed, Professor Freer recently observed that "[t]hough this is but one factor in a multifactor balancing test, federal courts have elevated it to primary importance by their reluctance to
dismiss in the absence of an adequate alternative forum." Freer, supra note 16, at 1078. Rule 19 can
be difficult to apply. See infra text accompanying note 123. But little judicial treatment of the rule,
especially in relationship to the exception, is as clear as it might be.
108. 309 U.S. 350 (1940).
109. Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 324 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (quoting Jeffries v. Georgia
Residential Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919 (11th Cir. 1982)). This proposition, derived from National
Licorice, is found in the first case applying the exception, Sansom Comm. v. Lynn, 366 F. Supp.
1271, 1281 (E.D. Pa. 1973), and in half of the opinions issued between Sierra Club and Sansom
Comm. Reliance on this proposition with little more is not the only example of unclear judicial
articulation of the exception. But this is the best example, because it is so ubiquitous, both in the
sense of being widespread and because it illustrates numerous difficulties in judicial enunciation of
the exception in terms of rule 19.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 21-29.
111. Indeed, abiding solicitude for absentees is fundamental to National Licorice. See supra text
accompanying notes 26-27.
112. In some situations, when a fair solution is readily available, the inquiry can be less thorough. Even then, however, judges should clearly explain the resolution reached.
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to be premised on a judgment that absentees are "indispensable," while continuing is to be based on the decision that absentees are not indispensable. But both
determinations are conclusory ones meant to attach only at the very end of the
process described. 113 The drafters who amended rule 19(b) a quarter century
after National Licorice was decided, and the Supreme Court Justices applying
the new version two years later, expressly admonished judges to determine
whether absentees are indispensable only after treating relevant considerations.114 Forinstance, Justice Harlan emphasized that saying a "court 'must'
dismiss in the absence of an indispensable party ... puts the matter the wrong
way around: a court does not know whether a particular person is 'indispensable' until it has examined the situation to determine whether it can proceed without him." 115
By depending on the proposition derived from National Licorice with little
more, judges have failed to articulate explicitly the factors that comprise their
determinations. As a result, readers cannot discern whether courts properly resolved the joinder question or even if they correctly performed the rule 19 inquiry.116 Most important, it is difficult to determine whether courts were
sufficiently solicitous of absentees. Judges have often failed to mention absentee
prejudice expressly, and in several recent public rights cases absentees were sufficiently injured to contest trial judges' decisions not to require absentee joinder.117 In one case absentees had spent millions of dollars exploring for natural
resources on public lands in reliance on agency representations that it was
proper to do so. These investments allegedly would be lost should the appeal be
rejected, as adequate relief cannot be secured from the government under present compensation systems. 118
Perhaps reliance on the idea drawn from National Licorice to the exclusion
113. For a detailed analysis of the rule 19 inquiry, see infra text accompanying notes 124-255.
114. See Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 118-19 n.15
(1968); Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 93.
115. Provident Tradesmens, 390 U.S. at 119.
116. The reasoning processes can be determined only by scrutinizing the facts or supplying miss·
ing particulars, such as the number and geographic location of absentees, the nature of their interests
and possible prejudice of proceeding without absentees as well as the location of an alternative forum
where plaintiff could sue and the relative convenience of pursuing that option. See also K. LLEWEL·
LYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 38 (1960) (late nineteenth century judiciary's "guerrilla raids
on statutes by way of 'strict construction' " made every statutory case a faro game); supra note 13
and accompanying text (similar characterization of difficulties entailed in understanding Shields v.
Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130 (1855)).
117. See Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1986); Conner v.
Burford, 605 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mont. 1985), appeal filed, No. 85-3935 (9th Cir. argued July 11,
1986); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609 (D.D.C. 1985) (mem.),
ajf'd on rehearing, 24 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 1082 (D.D.C. 1986), appeal filed, Nos. 86-5239, 86-5240
(D.C. Cir. 1986).
118. The case is National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609 (D.D.C.
1985) (mem.), ajf'd on rehearing, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1082 (D.D.C. 1986) (mem.), appeal filed,
Nos. 86-5239, 86-5240 (D.C. Cir. 1986). However, Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803
F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1986) and Conner v. Burford, 605 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mont. 1985), appeal filed, No.
85-3935 (9th Cir. argued July 11, 1986) are similar cases. Telephone interview with Constance
Brooks, Vice-President and General Counsel of the Mountain States Legal Foundation (MSLF),
Intervenor in National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford and Conner v. Burford (June 19, 1986) (alleging that
investment will be lost and noting that the other two cases are similar).
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of nearly all else constitutes a cryptic formulation of the inquiry rule 19 contemplates. Courts may have considered absentee interest and potential prejudice,
and joinder's feasibility under rule 19(a); they may also have analyzed absentee
prejudice and plaintiffs' forum needs, valued these and other relevant factors,
and balanced them when appropriate under rule 19(b). 119 For instance, a review
of some opinions in which judges depended on the proposition drawn from National Licorice with little more reveals that absentees seemed to have the requisite interest and their joinder appeared infeasible. 12 Concomitantly, prejudice
to absentees of proceeding apparently could have been kept minimal. Moreover,
plaintiffs may have had difficulty securing relief were dismissal ordered, because
no alternative forum was available in state court and even were there a forum at
the federal level its invocation would have been inconvenient. In those particular situations plaintiffs' needs were paramount and judges resolved the joinder
question properly by permitting the case to continue without requiring absentee
joinder. 121 However, these courts should have explained the considerations they
examined and how those factors yielded the determination that it was appropriate to continue. Instead, the judges, like courts in half of the cases recognizing
the public rights exception, relied almost exclusively on the uninformative proposition that " 'when litigation seeks the vindication of a public right, third persons who may be adversely affected by a decision favorable to the plaintiff do not
thereby become indispensable parties.' "122

°

In sum, although a dozen federal courts have recognized a public rights
exception, none has clearly enunciated it, and some treatment has been strained
or unexplained. Moreover, few judges have expressly exhibited regard for relevant interests other than those of plaintiffs, even for absentees threatened with
substantial loss-interests rule 19 requires be considered. In fairness, all of the
courts were addressing a difficult question of party joinder that appeared to have
no simple solution and whose proper resolution might have seemed to mandate
dismissal of sympathetic plaintiffs' public rights cases. Judges had to apply a
119. This list is neither exhaustive nor universally applicable. For a suggested analysis, meant to
provide an example of the type of comprehensive inquiry that rule 19 contemplates in certain cases,
see infra text accompanying notes 124-255. See also infra note 133 (discussing the possibility of
streamlined analysis).
120. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305 (E.D. Cal. 1985); Swomley v. Watt, 526 F.
Supp. 1271 (D.D.C. 1981).
121. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 319-25 (E.D. Cal. 1985); Swomley v. Watt,
526 F. Supp. 1271, 1273 (D.D.C. 1981); see also infra note 203 (noting that no state forum is available when plaintiffs challenge federal activity).
122. Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 324 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (quoting Jeffries v. Georgia
Residential Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919, 929 (11th Cir. 1982)). Ironically, the public rights exception
when so viewed resurrects the very deficiencies in the 1938 rule and its attendant application that
necessitated the 1966 amendment. The sloganeering, jurisprudence of labels, and failure to consider
relevant interests and explain determinations that the rulemakers meant to remedy, see supra text
accompanying notes 30-48, are merely revisited with invocation of the "public interest"-even could
one overcome the difficulties of defining that elastic concept and ascertaining who should represent
it. These difficulties are nicely illustrated by the rise of entities like MSLF that represent interests
like those of lessees. For discussions of the "public interest," see G. SCHUBERT, THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1962); Gellhom, supra note 59, at 360. Indeed, the cases read as a group leave the impression that there is an exception to each of rule 19's three principal components: 19(a), the joinder
requirements, and 19(b).
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federal rule that essentially enjoined them to "do equity" by examining several
difficult-to-evaluate, conflicting considerations, while accommodating the developing concept of public rights litigation.1 23
Given these constraints, the exception afforded a workable, albeit problematic solution. The difficulties with these cases lie primarily in what courts omitted, assumed, or stated unclearly. These problems do not necessarily mean that
judges resolved the joinder issue erroneously. Indeed, a number of courts apparent1y made correct decisions and certainly effectuated rule 19's weighty concern
for plaintiffs' forum needs. However, the reader of judicial opinions invoking
the public rights exception cannot positively determine if most of the courtS
reached appropriate conclusions. Moreover, it is often difficult to ascertain
whether judges followed the rule's steps in resolving the joinder question, and a
few judges apparently ignored or even violated the rule's explicit commands.
Indeed, it is impossible to discern what some judges applying the exception in
fact did. Regardless of whether these joinder issues were properly concluded,
the unclear judicial treatment has protracted litigation and wasted resources and
may have eroded respect for the judiciary.
Although courts have not clearly articulated the public rights exception,
they generally have seemed able to resolve the joinder issue correctly. This suggests that the public rights exception is not needed. Perhaps the most provocative question the cases raise is whether judges could have solved the pertinent
joinder problem, without the complications accompanying the exception's application, by employing rule 19 and additional available mechanisms, especially
those in other federal rules and the United States Code. Thus, although the
public rights exception has been invoked more frequently during the 1980s, the
exception cannot be enunciated satisfactorily, and its application seems unwarranted. Because public rights litigation is increasing substantially, the federal
judiciary should encounter the party joinder question even more frequently. It is
important, therefore, to determine whether the party joinder issue can be treated
more appropriately under rule 19 and additional existing measures.

III. A

SUGGESTED ANALYSIS

Analysis of the cases indicates that some courts created the public rights
exception because they believed that application of rule 19 effectively would end
public rights litigation. Correspondingly, few judges expressly evinced regard
for relevant interests other than those of plaintiffs. As discussed later, however,
concerns about rule 19's application to public rights litigation were unfounded
and the apparent lack of solicitude for additional interests was inappropriate.
The nature of public rights litigation and of the rule 19 inquiry means that
judges can facilitate plaintiffs' vindication of public rights and better accommodate other interests. Thus, it is important to explore how courts might apply the
rule to the joinder problem. This Article provides both general guidance and a
123. Judges may have believed that rule 19 contemplated polycentric decisionmaking. See
Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. R.Ev. 353, 394-404 (1978).
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specific assessment that principally entails rule 19 analysis, integrated with nonrule 19 elements, when proper. 124 The entire examination is tailored to the realities of public rights litigation, with pertinent illustrations drawn from the case
law, and relies on rule 19's phraseology as well as pronouncements of the
rulemakers and judges applying the rule and the public rights exception. 125
A.

General Guidance

A court may consider the party joinder question posed by public rights
litigation on its own motion 126 or that of the defendant, who generally bears the
124. It is helpful to view the 1966 party joinder amendments as a package of different tools
designed to solve similar problems. Thus, this Article focuses on rule 19, augmenting the discussion
with FED. R. C1v. P. 23 (class actions) and FED. R. C1v. P. 24 (intervention), whenever those rules
facilitate analysis. For similar approaches, see Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818,
824-29 (5th Cir. 1967); Coalition on Sensible Transp., Inc. v. Dole, 631 F. Supp. 1382, 1386-88
(D.D.C. 1986); McCoid, A Single Package For Multiparty Disputes, 28 STAN. L. REv. 707 (1976).
The rulemakers also accorded interrelated treatment to the three rules. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24,
Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. 109 (1966) [hereinafter Rule 24 Advisory Comm. Note]; Kaplan,
supra note 5. It is also important to be aware that the joinder difficulty posed by public rights
litigation can present problems different from those typically raised by more traditional private law
litigation. For instance, the government has less incentive to notify the court of absentees' existence
or to notify the absentees than do defendants in more traditional suits, because the government will
not be liable to absentees under existing compensation schemes. See also Freer, supra note 16 (discussing joinder problems raised by traditional litigation). By offering a rule 19 solution to this joinder difficulty, this Article is not necessarily endorsing the rule. It merely suggests that the exception
is problematic, while rule 19 affords a workable, if less than optimal, solution to the particular
difficulty. Professor Freer recently has offered valuable suggestions for restructuring rule 19 in the
context of traditional private law litigation, although he explicitly excluded public rights litigation
from his consideration. See Freer, supra note 16, at 1063 n.31, 1097-1110. These recommendations
warrant serious consideration, but seem unlikely to be adopted in the near future. Moreover, if the
suggestions were adopted, the applicability of certain ones to public law litigation may be problematic. Nonetheless, a number of them apply to public rights litigation and are included in later analysis. Professor Freer's ideas regarding rule 19(c), which requires the plaintiff to notify the court of
absentees, are illustrative. Freer, supra note 16, at 1085-88. Thus, although his advocacy of more
rigorous judicial enforcement of the notification requirement is appropriate, his suggestion that
courts impose sanctions against violators may be inadvisable in public rights litigation. See infra
notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
125. Rule 19 Advisory Committee Note is a convenient source for the rule and rulemaker pronouncements, although the reader may wish to consult the rule's text, which is reproduced in full
supra note 2, in considering the later analysis. It may seem curious to rely on cases recognizing the
exception, given the criticisms above, but many of the cases inform the later analysis. See National
Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't Rep. Cas (BNA) 1609, 1612-13 (D.D.C. 1985) (mem.) (example
of helpful rule 19 analysis; problematic invocation of exception).
The guidance provided by the later analysis is less full and general than it might be, because the
author had to make choices about depth, detail, and relevance. It also is not dispositive, because
every situation cannot be anticipated. Even could more precise advice be afforded, it seems inadvisable, as judges should be free to tailor analysis to the specific circumstances they confront. But the
guidance offered should enable courts to apply rule 19 efficaciously to most situations in which they
must treat the joinder question raised by public rights suits. When other approaches appear preferable, they should be employed.
As generally used here, "interest" means stake and "consideration" means element to be
treated. But each also may have more specific connotations in the later analysis. Interest may mean
what is needed to satisfy rule 19(a)'s criteria, like a mineral lease of public lands. See infra text
accompanying notes 144-77. Moreover, it was employed in Provident Tradesmens to facilitate treatment of rule 19(b)'s four stated factors. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390
U.S. 102, 109-12 (1968). Interest as so used and the rule 19(b) factors will be described generically
as considerations. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 181-97.
126. See McCowen v. Jamieson, 724 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1984); Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F.
Supp. 305, 320 (E.D. Cal. 1985); 7 c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 1609, at 89.
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burden of proof or persuasion. 127 The judge first determines, under rule 19(a)'s
three stated criteria, if an absentee is needed for just adjudication. This is
achieved by determining whether the absentee has an interest in the case that
could be harmed by the suit's resolution or whether the entity's absence could
adversely affect one of the litigants. 128 If an absentee is needed, the court next
decides whether the entity's joinder is feasible, examining subject matter jurisdiction, venue, and service of process. 129 When joinder is feasible, the judge
must ar-der that the absentee be made a party. 130 If absentee joh1der is infeasible, the court determines under rule 19(b) whether in "equity and good conscience" the action should proceed without the absentee or be dismissed. 131
This judgment is to be premised on four stated factors: the plaintiff's forum
needs, the likelihood of absentee prejudice, the defendant's interest in avoiding
additional or inconsistent litigation or obligations, and the public's interest in
efficient dispute resolution, as well as other considerations that may be
pertinent. 132
127. See Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 319-21 (E.D. Cal. 1985); Kalmich v. Bruno, 404
F. Supp. 57, 61 (N.D. Ill. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 553 F.2d 549 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 940 (1977). See generally Pulitzer-Polster v. Pulitzer, 784 F.2d 1305, 1309 (5th Cir. 1986)
(discussing proof and persuasion burdens).
128. The rule provides in pertinent part:
(a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who [can be served and will not destroy
jurisdiction and as to whom venue is proper] shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in
his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he
claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition
of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to
protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persens already parties subject to a substantial
risk of incurring double, multiple; or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his
claimed interest. . . .
FED. R. C1v. P. 19(a). For more analysis of this part of the rule, see infra text accompanying notes
144-77.
129. The rule provides in pertinent part:
(a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process and
whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action
shall be joined as a party in the action if [the person satisfies one of the three criteria
stated]. If the joined party objects to venue and his joinder would render the venue of the
action improper, he shall be dismissed from the action.
FED. R. C1v. P. 19(a). For more analysis of this part of the rule, see infra text accompanying notes
178-80.
130. Rule 19(a) provides in pertinent part that if the absentee "has not been so joined, the court
shall order that he be made a party." FED. R. C1v. P. 19(a).
131. The rule provides in pertinent part:
(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder Not Feasible. Ifa person as described in
subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in
equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or
should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable....
FED. R. av. P. 19(b).
132. The rule provides in pertinent part:
The factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; second,
the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or
other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an
adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
FED. R. C1v. P. 19(b). For more analysis of this part of the rule, see infra text accompanying notes
181-255.
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In a number of instances, the character of this inquiry and of public rights
litigation means that the relevant joinder difficulty can be solved by following
the rule's steps. In these cases absentees will be needed for just adjudication due
to the nature of absentee interests and the way they are affected in public rights
suits as well as the relative ease with which one rule 19(a) criterion may be met.
Joinder will be infeasible because of certain characteristics of public rights litigation, such as the large number and wide geographic distribution of absentees,
and the comparative difficulty of satisfying all of the rule 19 joinder limitations.
Accordingly, the inquiry becomes a rule 19(b) query whether it is more fair to
continue without absentees or to dismiss the plaintiff's case. However, judges
can employ numerous mechanisms to avoid either extreme alternative, or its
more detrimental consequences, and accommodate pertinent interests.
Thus, rule 19 and other available measures better enable courts to solve the
joinder problem, expeditiously and fairly ending the inquiry. These considerations have important implications for the order, scope, depth, and other aspects
of the analysis undertaken by judges who may want to follow certain general
guidelines. 133 There is no prescribed formula for making most determinations
required by the rule. 134 Thus, courts can exercise substantial discretion,
pragmatically and flexibly assessing the relevant considerations in each case. 135
As early as possible in a lawsuit, judges should anticipate and attempt to
solve the joinder difficulty. At the suit's commencement courts should be aware
of the joinder question by virtue of rule 19(c), which requires that the plaintiff's
initial pleading include the identity of entities that may satisfy rule 19(a), but are
not joined, and why they have not been joined. 136 If the plaintiff neglects this
duty, as often happens in private as well as public rights litigation, 137 a problem
may arise, because the government has less incentive to notify the court or absentees than do defendants in more traditional cases. 138 Accordingly, judges
133. In considering the order, for example, judges generally should proceed from the most to the
least auspicious possibilities, so that some aspects of the analysis can be omitted or performed less
rigorously. Similarly, the guidance provided by the later analysis does not follow rule 19's steps
precisely. For discussion of scope and depth, see infra notes 143, 146-48 and accompanying text.
134. See Provident Tradesmens, 390 U.S. at 118 n.14 (applying rule 19(b)); Northern Alaska
Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466, 468 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying rule 19(a)); Balda v. County of
Los Angeles, 687 F.2d 299, 301 (9th Cir. 1982) (applying rule 19(a)); 7
WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
supra note 2, § 1604, at 35 (discussing the application of rule 19(a)).
135. See Provident Tradesmens, 390 U.S. at 117-19; Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 N. Cal. Counties
Joint Apprenticeship & Training Comm., 459 U.S. 917, 920 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari); J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 6.5, at 341-42
(1985); F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 42, § 10.13, at 541; 7
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra
note 2, § 1604, at 45-46, § 1607, at 59-65; § 1608, at 66.
136. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(c). For more discussion of this requirement, see Rule 19 Advisory
Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 93-94; 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 1610, at 103,
§ 1625, at 253.
137. For a discussion of plaintiffs' neglect in private litigation, see Freer, supra note 16, at 108588. In the recent public rights case of Conner v. Burford, 605 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mont. 1985), plaintiff's counsel did not comply with rule 19(c) because the timing of governmental lease issuance and
the difficulty of researching lessees' names and addresses in government records would have left
insufficient time to sue. Interview with Tom France (attorney for plaintiff in Conner) (June 19,
1986).
138. This is what counsel for intervenors on appeal in Conner v. Burford, 605 F. Supp. 107 (D.
Mont. 1985), asserts happened in that case. Telephone interview, supra note 118. The government
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should remember that much public rights litigation potentially poses joinder difficulties, and they may want to consider several options, such as raising the joinder issue sua sponte or notifying absentees. 139
Once judges identify the joinder issue, they should survey the situation,
searching for promising solutions, such as affording absentees notice and the
opportunity to enter the litigation. 140 At the outset, courts also should canvass
factual information such as the number of absentees and their location, remedies
for the joinder problem, such as intervention, and the ramifications of applying
the mechanisms, such as their practical impact on absentees. 141 Judges then
should examine more closely all pertinent considerations, particularly the plaintiff's and absentees' interests; quantify and refine the considerations, when appropriate; and compare and balance them, as indicated. Because there are
numerous fair solutions, judges should be wary of terminating the inquiry prematurely. Rather than invoking the Draconian alternatives of dismissing the
action or proceeding, courts may want to resolve close questions in favor of
continuing the inquiry. 142 Nonetheless, when a fair solution is available, it
should be applied and the inquiry ended. Finally, courts always should explain
their resolution of the joinder issue-making clear which considerations were
examined and why, and how each consideration figured in the specific
determination. 143

B. Specific Guidance
1.

Rule 19(a): Persons Needed for Just Adjudication

Rule (19)(a) directs courts to ask whether absentees are entities that should
has less incentive to give notification because it will not subsequently be found liable under existing
government compensation schemes. See infra notes 238-39 and accompanying text.
139. See Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 93-94 (discussing the possibility of
court notifying absentees); supra text accompanying note 126 (discussing the possibility of court
raising sua sponte joinder issue). Professor Freer has suggested that sanctions might be imposed for
failure to comply with rule 19(c). See Freer, supra note 16, at 1085 n.116. Sanctions may be too
harsh as applied to the public interest litigant with limited resources and little time to append the
names of all absentees to the complaint. But judges may want to consider more rigorous enforcement of the requirement, and it is fair to require such a litigant to inform the court of the possible
existence of absentees, so that the court might institute appropriate action. See Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176 (1974) (nothing in rule 23 suggests notice requirements can be tailored
to plaintiff's pocketbook).
140. For instance, such a survey might reveal that absentees are few in number, readily identifiable, and nearby, so that notifying them and affording the opportunity to intervene may be a quick,
easy solution. Indeed, this could be a promising solution in a number of situations, but it appears
rarely to have been invoked in cases in which the exception was applied. See supra text accompanying note 91.
141. These are only examples. For more thorough treatment, see infra text accompanying notes
144-255. Even when this exercise does not end the inquiry, it should facilitate later analysis.
142. See infra note 183 and accompanying text. Cf Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 324
(E.D. Cal. 1985) (helpful example of judicial resolution of close questions); Fink, supra note 31, at
448 (characterizing such Draconian options as a "cruel choice"). Moreover, proper solutions may
become clear only at the inquiry's end.
143. Several circuits have said that a trial judge's rule 19 determination must include a thorough
statement of the facts and reasons for the decision. See Bakia v. County of Los Angeles, 687 F.2d
299, 301 (9th Cir. 1982); Bio-Analytical Serv. v. Edgewater Hosp., 565 F.2d 450, 452 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978); Manygoats v. Kleppe, 558 F.2d 556, 559 (10th Cir. 1977).
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be joined in the litigation, if feasible. 144 No precise test exists: absentees must
meet one of three stated criteria, which essentially consider whether absentees
possess an interest in the suit that could be threatened by its resolution or if their
absence could jeopardize interests of parties to the case. 145 The character of
absentee interests in, and how they are influenced by, public rights litigation and
the relatively undemanding, pragmatic nature of the second criterion, rule
19(a)(2)(i), mean this inquiry will be answered affirmatively in numerous situations. 146 When the second criterion is not met, it is unlikely that the third criterion, rule 19 (a)(2)(ii), will be met, while the first criterion, rule 19(a)(l),
apparently has no independent significance.
In a number of situations judges easily can determine that the second criterion is satisfied. They can then proceed directly to the rule 19(b) component of
the inquiry. One assessment central to rule 19{b), however, is similar to the one
needed to determine that the second rule 19{a) criterion is not met. 147 This
congruity and the possibility of terminating or facilitating numerous inquiries
warrant focusing on the second criterion. 148
a.

Rule 19(a){2)(i): Absentee Interest and Potential Prejudice

The second criterion asks whether an absentee "claims an interest relating
to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in
his absence may ... as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect
that interest." 149 The criterion can be satisfied when the absentee interest is
protectable and will be affected considerably if suit continues without the absentee.150 Thus, the nature of absentee interests, and the way they are affected, in
144. The rule defines those that "should be joined as parties so that they may be heard and a
complete disposition made." Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 89.
145. See J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 135, § 6.5, at 334-44; 7 c.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 1604, at 35. The criteria are treated more fully than they
might otherwise be, because they are similar to three of rule 19(b)'s four stated factors.
146. These factors may explain why many courts treat rule 19(a) tersely, "assuming the existence of a person who should be joined if feasible." Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v.
Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 118 (1968); accord NRDC v. TVA, 340 F. Supp. 400, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1971),
rev'd on other grounds, 459 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1972). But see infra notes 160-66 and accompanying
text (discussing some courts' technical treatment of absentee interests).
147. Rule 19(b)'s first stated factor asks "to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's
absence might be prejudicial to him." For analysis of the factor, see infra notes 186-97 and accompanying text. This factor may differ subtly from rule 19(a). Rule 19(b) may be more analytical,
asking about the likelihood of prejudice on the facts of each case, while rule l 9(a) asks whether there
may be some prejudice.
148. The approach in the text is meant to foster judicial economy. If courts must refine absentee
prejudice under rule 19(b), they may as well do so at this juncture, while conducting a similar, albeit
cruder, inquiry.
149. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(2)(i). This criterion "recognizes the importance of protecting [the
absentee] against the practical prejudice to him" of proceeding without that person. Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 91.
150. See, e.g., Doty v. St. Mary Parish Land Co., 598 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1979); Atlantis Dev.
Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 822-29 (5th Cir. 1967); see also NRDC v. NRC, 578 F.2d
1341, 1343-45 (10th Cir. 1978) (noting similar requirements for satisfying rule 24); Nuesse v. Camp,
385 F.2d 694, 700-02 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (noting similar requirements for satisfying rule 24); Rule 24
Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 124, at 109-10 (noting that rules 24 and 19 emphasize practical
prejudice).
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public rights cases and the criterion's comparatively unrestrictive, pragmatic
character mean it will be met in numerous instances. Moreover, in most of these
situations courts easily can detect that the second criterion has been satisfied and
then tum to rule 19(b). For the reasons stated above, however, judges should
examine closely absentee interests and the practical impact of proceeding. 151
Courts should scrutinize absentee interests and the pragmatic effect on absentees in terms of such parameters as substantive legal nature or tangibility. 152
In analyzing the substantive legal nature of an absentee interest, judges might
ask whether it is a property right, a contract, or something less, like an opportunity for employment derived from filing an application. In assessing the tangibility of practical effect on absentees, courts could consider whether the impact
is "immediate and serious, or remote and minor." 153 Courts should also assess
the legal effect of entering judgment in litigation that continues without absentees, such as whether the judgment could have a stare decisis effect and what
that might mean for absentees' interests. 154 Courts then may want to quantify
absentee interest and impact on absentees, assigning them preliminary values
through the use of such parameters as quality and magnitude. 155 Exacting numerical quantification is neither contemplated nor necessary. In most circumstances comparing and contrasting should suffice. For instance, a right to
exclusive possession of property obviously will be accorded greater weight than
an application for a one-season permit to explore on the public lands. Similarly,
a judgment that could have an adverse stare decisis effect will be more significant
than a judgment that would have less persuasive impact. 156 Another helpful
example, drawn from a pending case, is absentee exploration for, and development of, natural resources pursuant to a government lease that is threatened
with modification by public rights litigation. This interest could be quantified in
terms of its technical legal character, in terms of money committed to exploration and development, or in terms of the natural resources' worth and how much
the value of that interest might be diminished by proceeding to judgment with151. If judges encounter difficulty securing the requisite data from litigants, courts should contact absentees. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (noting the possibility of a court notifying
absentees of litigation). For judicial analysis of absentee interests and practical impacts, see United
States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 983-84 (2d Cir. 1984); Neusse v. Camp, 385
F.2d 694, 700-02 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 822-29 (5th
Cir. 1967).
152. The treatment in this paragraph is not meant to be exhaustive but merely to suggest possible approaches derived principally from the Advisory Committee Note and case law.
153. See Rule 19 Advisory Committee Note, supra note 20, at 92.
154. For example, the stare decisis effect of a judgment adjudicating the applicability of national
legislation could seriously affect an absentee, because another court would be unlikely to view the
legislation differently. For more discussion of the technical legal effect of entering judgment, see
infra notes 167 & 217 and accompanying text, infra note 206.
155. This approach may appear more art than science and even require crude estimates, but
courts can do it, often rather easily. But see infra note 193 (discussing rule 19(b) quantification
difficulties).
156. Compare the right to exclusive possession at issue in National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609, 1612-13 (D.D.C. 1985) (mem.) with the application for a one-season
mining permit at issue in Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466, 467-69 (9th Cir.
1986). The stare decisis effect of a judgment could effectively preclude absentees' opportunity to
protect their interests. See infra notes 167 & 217 and accompanying text.
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out absentees. 157
In performing this analysis, courts should remember that the second criterion explicitly mandates consideration of practical prejudice to absentees; pragmatism is rule 19's touchstone. Accordingly, several technical concepts that
could govern application of the criterion should not do so. For instance, judges
have found that absentees will not be affected adversely when they are "adequately represented" by others who can accurately inform the court of potential
absentee prejudice and fully and fairly protect absentees' interests in the litigation.158 But dissimilarities between interests of absentees and governmental defendants, difficulties in measuring and articulating absentee prejudice, questions
regarding the quality of advocacy, and other complications make it nearly impossible to ensure that there will be adequate representation. 159 A second,
rather abstract notion has been enunciated in two recent public rights cases. 160
The courts have considered absentees with some "interest" in the public landslike a subsurface estate mineral fee-not to have a "legally protected interest" in
the litigation's subject matter. The judges have characterized the subject matter
of the litigation as challenges to agency procedures or decisions governing use of
those lands. 161 But each court's pronouncement belies such a technical interpretation of the second criterion and underscores the problems entailed in a technical reading of that criterion, especially the important practical implications for
absentees. One court expressly acknowledged the "real financial hardship" imposed on absentees prevented from mining during a short summer season and
explicitly admonished the district court not to "ignore those concerns in passing
on plans for mining operations." 162 The second court expressly recognized that
the "technical scope of the subject matter of the litigation may not serve as the
only benchmark of resolution of a joinder motion." 163 A closely related techni157. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. A similar interest, the "right" of a permittee
who had discovered coal in commercial quantities on public lands to a preference right coal lease,
was considered sufficient in NRDC v. Berklund, 458 F. Supp. 925, 933 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd, 609
F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam). However, an application for a one-season mining permit
was found insufficient in Northern Alaska Envt'I Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466, 468-69 (9th Cir.
1986). Several courts have also indicated that the generalized interest of all citizens in an agency
rule's validity might not suffice. See Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 324-25 (E.D. Cal. 1985);
NAACP v. Donovan, 558 F. Supp. 218, 223 (D.D.C. 1982).
158. See, e.g., Jeffries v. Georgia Residential Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919, 928-29 (11th Cir.), cert.
de11ied, 459 U.S. 971 (1982); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Lake Shore Land Co., 610 F.2d 1185, 1191 (3d
Cir. 1979); see also 3A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, ~ 19.07[2.-1], at 19-106 (citing
adequate representation for proposition that "as a practical matter" has restrictive and expansive
side).
159. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 2J Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609, 1613 (D.D.C.
1985) (mem.), aff'd on rehearing, 24 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 1082 (D.D.C. 1986) (mem.), appeal filed,
Nos. 86-5239, 86-5240 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see also United States v. Stringfellow, 783 F.2d 821, 826-27
(9th Cir. 1986) (similar treatment of "adequate representation" under rule 24, which unlike rule 19
explicitly mandates its consideration), rev'd on other grounds sub. nom. Stringfellow v. Concerned
Neighbors in Action, 107 S. Ct. 1177 (1987); National Farm Lines v. ICC, 564 F.2d 381, 383-84
(10th Cir. 1977) (similar treatment of "adequate representation" under rule 24).
160. See Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466, 468-69 (9th Cir. 1986); Sierra
Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 321-24 (E.D. Cal. 1985).
161. Northern Alaska Envtl. Center, 803 F.2d at 468-69; Sierra Club, 608 F. Supp. at 321-24.
162. Northern Alaska Envtl. Center, 803 F.2d at 471.
163. Sierra Club, 608 F. Supp. at 322.
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cal idea is that public rights litigation affects absentees' interests only minimally
because these interests are technically independent of the litigation and thus can
be vindicated in separate, subsequent suits. 164 However, this viewpoint trivializes rule 19's significant goal of minimizing multiple litigation. 165 The perspective also ignores pragmatic consequences that may well be compelling for
absentees; absentees that could be substantially prejudiced by their inability to
secure efficacious, later relief against the government. 166 A final concern is
whether the potential stare decisis effect of a judgment rendered in litigation that
proceeds without absentees satisfies the second criterion's requirement that absentees' interests be "practically impaired." Because the possible stare decisis
effect of a judgment in public rights litigation, such as suits that adjudicate the
applicability of national legislation, can affect absentees' interests significantly,
that impact should suffice. 167
Thus, this evaluation indicates that rule 19(a)(2)(i) will be satisfied in numerous circumstances. There might be some instances, however, when this second criterion is not met. In such situations judges then must determine whether
the rule's first or third criterion is satisfied.
b.

Rule 19(a)(l) and (2)(ii)

The first criterion, rule 19(a)(l), "stresses the desirability of joining those
persons in whose absence the court would be obliged to grant partial or 'hollow'
rather than complete relief to the parties before the court." 168 Public rights
litigation arguably does not satisfy this criterion's literal terms, because
"[c]omplete relief refers to relief as between the persons already parties, not as
between a party and the absent person whose joinder is sought." 169 In public
rights cases the governmental defendant is said to be the only entity responsible
for the challenged activity as well as the only entity sought to be, and actually,
bound, so that comprehensive relief can be afforded between the litigants.17°
Judges may reject this proposition either because they find it overly technical or
164. See, e.g., Jeffries v. Georgia Residential Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919, 928-29 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 971 (1982); Sierra Club, 608 F. Supp. at 321-24.
165. See infra notes 172, 238 and accompanying text.
166. See supra text accompanying note 118; infra notes 167, 238-39 and accompanying text.
167. See Doty v. St. Mary Parish Land Co., 598 F.2d 885, 887 (5th Cir. 1979); Atlantis Dev.
Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 822-29 (5th Cir. 1967); J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A.
MILLER, supra note 135, § 6.5, at 339; see also NRDC v. NRC, 578 F.2d 1341, 1345 (10th Cir. 1978)
(stare decisis effect should suffice under rule 24); Note, Intervention in Government Enforcement
Actions, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1174, 1180-83 (1976) (contextual analysis of stare decisis). See infra note
206 (suggesting that absentee who failed to enter suit when able to do so might be bound by determination in suit). Indeed, absentees' opportunity to protect themselves may be effectively precluded
when one federal court adjudicates the applicability of national legislation, because another federal
court will be unlikely to view the legislation differently. See infra note 217 and accompanying text.
168. Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 91. Rule 19(a)(l) states that an absentee
"shall be joined if in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties."
FED. R. C1v. P. 19(a)(l).
169. Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 321 n.26 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (citation omitted); accord
Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466, 468 (9th Cir. 1986).
170. See Northern Alaska Envtl. Center, 803 F.2d at 468; Sierra Club, 608 F. Supp. at 321 n.26.
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because they pragmatically recognize the potential for absentee prejudice. 171
However, if courts find the proposition too abstract or refute it on pragmatic
grounds, the remaining consideration relevant to this criterion-rulemaker concern that parties would pursue multiple litigation 172-will not materialize because the plaintiff and the defendant have no reason to bring additional claims
when courts grant complete relief.1 73
The third criterion, rule 19(a)(2)(ii), asks "whether a party may be left,
after the adjudication, in a position where a person not joined can subject him to
a double or otherwise inconsistent liability." 174 In public rights litigation the
only conceivable circumstance under which a governmental defendant may incur such responsibilities is when absentees are sufficiently prejudiced to pursue
independent actions and, therefore, satisfy the second criterion, rule 19(a)(2)(i).
Absentees will have little reason to sue separately unless they are injured enough
to meet that criterion. 175 Even then, however, the government will not be "subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent
obligations." 176 The government may owe no legal responsibility to the absentee or the harm sustained may not support a cause of action. 177
In short, there may be situations in which none of the three rule 19(a) criteria is met, so the inquiry may end. In most instances, however, the second criterion will be satisfied. In a small number of these circumstances it will be
possible to avoid the rule 19(b) inquiry, if the rule's joinder requirements can be
met.
2.

Rule 19 Joinder Limitations

If an absentee needed for just adjudication under rule 19(a) can be served,
does not make a valid objection to venue, and will not deprive the court of jurisdiction, the "court shall order that he be made a party." 178 These determinations regarding the feasibility of joinder involve a plethora of complex issues that
demand consideration of other federal rules, the United States Code, state statutes, and the Constitution. Accordingly, it is exceedingly difficult to determine
whether all the limitations are satisfied and whether joinder is feasible in specific
171. See supra notes 162, 166-67 and accompanying text (discussing practical prejudice to absentees). It is important to understand, however, that absentee prejudice is not a relevant consideration
under this criterion, although it is relevant under rule 19(a)(2)(ii) and the first stated factor of rule
19(b).
172. Rule 19(a)(l) advances the public interest in "avoiding repeated lawsuits on the same essential subject matter." Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 91.
173. This obviously is related to the first consideration discussed supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text. Of course, absentees might pursue multiple litigation, but that is not relevant to this
criterion. See supra note 171. For helpful analysis of the criterion, concluding that it "lacks independent significance and ought to be jettisoned," see Freer, supra note 16, at 1062-63, 1080-82.
174. Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 91.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 149-67.
176. FED. R. C1v. P. 19(a)(2)(ii); see also Freer, supra note 16, at 1095 n.163 (absentee that is
unlikely to recover does not pose such a risk).
177. See infra notes 238-39 and accompanying text; see also Bozcon v. Northwestern Elevator
Co., Inc., 652 F. Supp. 1482, 1487 (E. D. Wis. 1987); FED. PROC. L. Bo. § 59:83 (1984) (joinder not
ordered when risk only of frivolous suit or absentee has no cause of action).
178. See FED. R. C1v. P. 19(a).

1987]

PUBLIC RIGHTS LITIGATION AND PARTY JOINDER

779

cases. 179 In some situations every joinder requirement may be met so that the
absentee may be joined and the inquiry terminated. 180 But the multitude and
relative stringency of constraints, as well as peculiar characteristics of public
rights litigation, such as the substantial number and geographic dispersion of
absentees, suggest that joinder will not be feasible in a number of circumstances.
Judges then must turn to the rule 19(b) element of the inquiry.
3. Rule 19(b): Determination by Court Whenever Joinder not Feasible
When it is infeasible to join an absentee needed for just adjudication, the
court must "determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should
proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person
being thus regarded as indispensable." 181 No formula exists for making this
judgment, which the Supreme Court has admonished "must be based on factors
varying with the different cases, some such factors being substantive, some procedural, some compelling by themselves, and some subject to balancing against
opposing interests." 182 Some guidance, however, can be suggested.
179. These considerations may explain why most courts treat joinder limitations tersely or assume some defect exists. The considerations, as compounded by the factual variations in public
rights cases, complicate meaningful generalization and make comprehensive exploration of all relevant questions beyond this Article's scope. For helpful discussions, see 3A MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE, supra note 2, 11 19.01-1.; 7 c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, §§ 1602, 1605-06,
1610. Nonetheless, courts should search for defects and explain clearly any found. See R. MARCUS
& E. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LmGATION 63-65 (1985) (analyzing many issues judges could consider
in determining joinder's feasibility).
180. The rule mandates joinder if feasible and dismissal if all absentees cannot be made parties.
This requirement is problematic in cases like Eldredge v. carpenters 46 N. Cal. Counties Joint Apprenticeship & Training Comm., 662 F.2d 534, 538 (9th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 459 U.S. 917
(1982). In that case, even if 4500 absent employers could have been joined, the litigation would have
been unmanageable. Similarly, in Conner v. Burford, 605 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mont. 1985), appeal
filed, No. 85-3935 (9th Cir. argued July 11, 1986), intervenors argued that the intra-jurisdictional
location of several hundred lessees and assignees mandated joinder. But plaintiff's counsel claimed
suit would be precluded, were joinder required (1) at the outset, because timing of lease issuance and
the difficulty of identifying absentees would have left insufficient time to sue, or (2) later, because of
the expense entailed. Interview with Tom France (June 19, 1986) (attorney for plaintiff in Conner).
Thus, a more flexible approach may be warranted by the considerations above, by the idea that
judicial discretion should be as great here as under rule l 9(b), and by the idea that representational
substitutes, like a defendant's class action, could respond to rule 19 concerns. See Kaplan, supra
note 5, at 403 n.178; Note, Defendant Class Actions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1978) (discussing
defendant class action suits). Nonetheless, cases such as Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156
(1974) and Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 807 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1986), suggest that the federal
judiciary should follow strictly or read literally the requirements of the Federal Rules, especially
those implicating plaintiff's notification costs. See infra note 225.
181. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b).
182. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 119 (1968). "Whether
a person is 'indispensable' ... can only be determined in the context of particular litigation." Id. at
118. The rulemakers stressed pragmatism, see Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 92,
while the Court found the "new version emphasize[d] the pragmatic consideration of the effects of
the alternatives of proceeding or dismissing." Provident Tradesmens, 390 U.S. at 117 n.12; accord,
Eldredge v. carpenters 46 N. Cal. Counties Joint Apprenticeship & Training Comm., 459 U.S. 917,
920 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A.
MILLER, supra note 135, § 6.5, at 341 (noting that courts have substantial discretion to make equity
and good conscience determination); cf. F. JAMES & G. HAzARD, supra note 42, § 10.13, at 542-43
(noting that courts have substantial discretion to make equity and good conscience determination); 7
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 1604, at 45-46, § 1607, at 65, § 1608, at 66 (noting that
courts have substantial discretion to make equity and good conscience determination).

780

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

The operative "equity and good conscience" language speaks in absolute
terms of continuing without absentees or dismissing the plaintiff's case. Nevertheless, numerous measures can be applied to avoid each possibility or its more
deleterious aspects, and these mechanisms should be invoked, when appropriate.183 Rule 19(b) "uses the word 'indispensable' only in a conclusory sense"; 184
judges are to determine whether absentees are indispensable only after considering pertinent factors. 185 Four factors, derived from prior case law, were explicitly included in the subdivision, 186 because the 1938 "rule did not state
affirmatively what factors were relevant." 187 The Supreme Court has found that
the four factors implicate the plaintiff's interest in a forum, 188 the interest of the
absentee, 189 the defendant's need to avoid "multiple litigation, or inconsistent
relief, or sole responsibility" for liability shared with another, 190 the public interest in "complete, consistent, and efficient settlement of controversies," 191 and
the "possibility of shaping relief to accommodate these four interests." 192
Although the factors do overlap to some extent, they are not very similar or
amenable to measurement. 193 The four factors are neither inflexible standards
nor equally applicable in all contexts. 194 Furthermore, the stated factors are not
exclusive; thus, courts may consider other factors that should be pertinent to
equity and good conscience. 195 These facts may explain why neither rule 19(b)
nor the Advisory Committee's Note expressly mention assigning values or pri183. The rulemakers prescribed many measures to avoid proceeding or dismissing. See Rule 19
Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 92; see also infra notes 206-13 and accompanying text
(discussing measures rulemakers prescribed and other measures).
184. Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 93; accord Freer, supra note 16, at 1077
n.83.
185. "[A] person is 'regarded as indispensable' when he cannot be made a party and, upon consideration of the factors above-mentioned, it is determined that in his absence it would be preferable
to dismiss the action ••.." Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 93 (emphasis added).
This and the quotation supra text accompanying note 184 appear verbatim in Provident Tradesmens
Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 118 n.15 (1968). See also supra text accompanying
note 115 (Court's reiteration of ideas in two rulemaker excerpts). "Factor" is the rulemakers' term
to describe what judges are to consider, and it is so used in this Article.
186. Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 92.
187. Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 92. For an explanation of these factors,
see id. at 91-92.
188. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 109 (1968).
189. Id. at 110.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 111.
192. Id. This Article uses the "interest" approach articulated by the Supreme Court.
193. For discussions of this overlap, see Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d
1030, 1043 n.15 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983); Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra
note 20, at 92. Comparison of the stated factors' terminology also illustrates that they overlap.
Dissimilarities between the factors and difficulties of measuring them are best illustrated by an example. How can termination of a case brought by one "public interest group" plaintiff that purports to
represent millions of people and the potential prejudice to hundreds of absentees of proceeding without them be assigned values so as to be meaningfully compared?
194. See Trombino v. Transit Casualty Co., 110 F.R.D. 139, 143 (D.R.I. 1986); 7 C. WRIGHT &
A. MILLER, supra note 2, §§ 1607-08 (discussing the factors' flexibility). A helpful example offiexibility appears in the second and third stated factors, which ask judges to consider the extent of
prejudice to the absentee.
195. "The factors are .•. not intended to exclude other considerations which may be applicable
in particular situations." Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 92; accord Provident
Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 112 (1968). For discussions of the factors'

1987]

PUBLIC RIGHTS LITIGATION AND PARTY JOINDER

781

orities to the stated factors, or additional factors relevant to equity and good
conscience or balancing the factors in reaching conclusions. 196 Nonetheless,
strong concern for plaintiffs' and absentees' interests-evidenced by the subdivision's explicit provision for their consideration and the rulemakers expressly
stated reasons for doing so-indicates that both interests are integral to the rule
19(b) inquiry. 197
Thus, this inquiry differs in certain particulars from the rule 19(a) inquiry.
Rule 19(b) in terms contemplates a relatively complex process of analysis, asking
judges to do equity by considering the difficult-to-assess effects on diverse interests of dismissing plaintiff's suit or proceeding without absentees. Moreover,
courts must consider numerous measures whose invocation could avoid either
dismissal or continuing without absentees. 198 But there are similarities between
the rule 19(a) and rule 19(b) inquiries. Most telling is the comparable ease with
which each inquiry may be completed; indeed, courts rather easily can answer
the crucial rule 19(b) equity and good conscience query in numerous situarelevance to equity and good conscience, see Envirotech Corp. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 729 F.2d
70, 77 (2d Cir. 1984); 7 c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 1607, at 65.
196. Professor Fink initially identified the absence of hierarchical weighting. See Fink, supra
note 31, at 424. Of course, the nonexclusive nature of the four stated factors makes this very difficult, see supra note 195, and the problem is compounded by attempting to contrast factors not
susceptible to comparison, see supra note 193. But case-by-case determinations can be premised on
the considerations present, especially when they differ greatly, and on factors' inclusion in the rule or
the language used. See infra note 197 and accompanying text. Indeed, the Provident Tradesmens
Court championed case-by-case analysis and provided for the possibilities of interest balancing and
assertion of compelling interests. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S.
102, 119 (1968); see supra text accompanying note 182; see also Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 N. Cal.
Counties Joint Apprenticeship & Training Comm., 459 U.S. 917, 920 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (acknowledging that rule 19(b) establishes a balancing process); Tick v.
Cohen, 787 F.2d 1490, 1494 (I Ith Cir. 1986) (acknowledging that rule 19(b) establishes a balancing
process).
197. See Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 89-93 (discussing rulemaker rationales). The first three factors mention or implicate absentee interests, and the fourth treats the
plaintiff's interest. The fourth factor asks also whether the plaintiff will have adequate relief if the
action is dismissed, while the initial two consider the extent of potential prejudice to the absentee and
the potential for reduction of this prejudice, thus perhaps evincing more solicitude for plaintiffs.
Later judicial pronouncements have confirmed the importance of the two interests. See, e.g., Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 109-12 (1968). But many judges now
find most important the plaintiff's forum needs. See Pasco Int'! (London) v. Stenograph Corp., 637
F.2d 496, 500 (7th Cir. 1980); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609,
1613 (D.D.C. 1985) (mem.), ajf'd on rehearing, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1082 (D.D.C. 1986) (mem.),
appeal filed, Nos. 86-5239, 86-5240 (D.C. Cir. 1986); 3A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note
2, 11 19.07-2[0], at 19-132 n.13; 11 19.07-2[4], at 19-154. Indeed, Professor Freer recently observed
that "[t]hough this is but one factor in a multifactor balancing test, federal courts have elevated it to
primary importance by their reluctance to dismiss in the absence of an adequate alternative forum."
Freer, supra note 16, at 1078 (footnote omitted); see also Von Bulow ex rel Auersperg v. Von Bulow,
634 F. Supp. 1284, 1312 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (illustrating court's reluctance to dismiss); Defenders of
Wildlife v. Andrus, 77 F.R.D. 448, 451 (D.D.C. 1978) (illustrating court's reluctance to dismiss); 7
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 1609, at 83 (noting courts' extreme reluctance to dismiss);
id. § 1604, at 45 (rule's philosophy to avoid dismissal whenever possible).
198. Thus, courts are asked for a very discretionary judgment, based on a quite general standard,
and numerous, complex calculations, so the task appears at once open-ended and polycentric. In
contrast, rule 19(a) asks if one rather easily satisfied criterion is met. These and other differences
thus warrant somewhat dissimilar treatment, which focuses on plaintiffs' and absentees' interests and
seeks felicitous solutions by accommodating both. See supra note 147 (noting the subtle difference
between rule 19(a) and rule 19(b)'s first stated factor).
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tions. 199 In many cases the substantial disparity between plaintiffs' and absentees' interests and the importance the subdivision accords both interests mean
the inquiry can be resolved easily; one interest will clearly be much more significant than the other. Many other instances can be treated almost as easily. In
some, reconsideration and refinement of plaintiffs' and absentees' interests will
disclose considerable disparity between them, while in the rest, examination of
additional relevant considerations alone, or with the two refined interests, will be
dispositive. This analysis suggests that a few, comparatively problematic circumstances remain, but even they can be treated. 200
a.

Preliminary Survey

The character of plaintiffs' and absentees' interests in public rights suits and
the significance rule 19(b) assigns them mean the inquiry can be easily resolved
because one interest obviously will be much greater than the other. In the vast
majority of these cases the plaintiff's interest in proceeding will be substantial, if
the case is dismissed, while absentees' interests will be small should the litigation
proceed. More specifically, the plaintiff's forum needs will be very difficult to
accommodate; absentees' large number and wide geographic distribution in public rights actions mean that the plaintiff either will have no forum or ineffective
alternatives. 201 Thus, dismissing the suit essentially will foreclose it. 202 For example, in a recent case involving public lands in seventeen states and implicating
interests of even more broadly dispersed absentees, the court observed:
Because of problems of jurisdiction and venue, plaintiff could never
join all defendants in one forum. Requiring it to bring seventeen separate lawsuits or even to combine actions through the device of multidistrict litigation would create enormous administrative disorder and
delay. Dismissal, therefore, would effectively discourage and, for all
199. There are other similarities. For instance, the way rule 19(a)'s analysis of absentee prejudice is structured makes it like the absentee prejudice analysis of rule 19(b). Moreover, rule 19(a)'s
three criteria implicate essentially the same concerns as rule 19(b)'s first three stated factors.
200. The guidance provided by this analysis is meant to maximize quick resolution of the rule
19(b) inquiry. Thus, it could expose judges to criticism for being unclear or too terse. The guidance
is meant to provide a thorough analytical framework, and when courts do not complete the inquiry
because they find a solution, judges need only explain it to avoid criticism. For full analysis, focusing
on the four factors, see 3A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, 1119.07-2; 7 c. WRIGHT &
A. MILLER, supra note 2, §§ 1607-08.
201. As applied to plaintiffs' and absentees' interests in this Article, "efficacy" implicates ability
to protect those interests and subsumes "convenience," which includes cost. For example, an alternative forum's efficacy includes whether the case would proceed, and, if so, possible delay and its
impact on the plaintiff's potential relief, and the expense of suing elsewhere.
202. Foreclosing suit implicates the fourth factor that asks whether "plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed." FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b); see also Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F.
Supp. 305, 325 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (noting that the " 'public interest exception' is the effectuation" of
this factor); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609, 1613 (D.D.C.
1985) (mem.), ajf'd on rehearing, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1082 (D.D.C. 1986) (mem.), appeal filed,
Nos. 86-5239, 86-5240 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 93 (looking to dismissal's "practical effects" and the existence of any assurance the plaintiff could sue effectively in another forum where better joinder possible); supra note 197 (citing examples of many
courts' phrasing question as one of availability of an alternative forum and characterizing as critical
consideration).
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practical purposes, put an end to this litigation.203
Correspondingly, in some of these circumstances absentees' interests would be
insubstantial, as would be potential prejudice.204 In other instances in which
absentees' interests are greater, those interests can be protected with many
rather convenient measures, a number of which could secure absentee presence
in the litigation. 205
Significant among these mechanisms are some that can be invoked by absentees, assuming they are aware that suit has been filed. Absentees may appear
voluntarily or intervene on an ancillary basis in the case.206 When entry of a
large number of absentees would be expensive for individual absentees or complicate the litigation, the absentees could pool their resources and have their
interests protected by representative absentees or an entity like Mountain States
Legal Foundation. 207 Absentees might also request transfer of the suit to a
203. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609, 1613 (D.D.C. 1985)
(mem.), aff'd on rehearing, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1082 (D.D.C. 1986), appeal filed, Nos. 86-5239,
86-5240 (D.C. Cir. 1986); accord Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 324-25 (E.D. Cal. 1985);
NRDC v. Berklund, 458 F. Supp. 925, 933 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd, 609 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per
curiarn). Of course, such litigation, ·which challenges federal activity by invoking federal question
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982), intrinsically eliminates the "most common alternative"
available to a plaintiff dismissed for nonjoinder-relitigation in state court. See J. FRIEDENTHAL,
M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 135, § 6.5, at 343.
204. See, e.g., Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466, 468·69 (9th Cir. 1986);
Swomley v. Watt, 526 F. Supp. 1271, 1273 (D.D.C. 1981). This situation implicates the first factor,
which asks to "what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to him"
or "[w]ould the absentee be adversely affected in a practical sense, and if so, would the prejudice be
immediate and serious, or remote and minor?" Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 92;
see also supra notes 149-67 and accompanying text (discussing similar inquiry for rule 19(a)(2)(i)).
205. The possibility of applying these measures principally implicates the second factor, asking
the "extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other
measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided." FED. R. Crv. P. 19(b). Thus, it includes the
measures available as well as their effect on prejudice and the inconvenience they entail. This is not
an exhaustive catalog of the measures but includes those most likely to apply in most situations.
Moreover, some can be used in combination. For comprehensive analysis of all the measures mentioned infra notes 206-14, 220-22 and accompanying text, most of which are drawn from other
Federal Rules or the United States Code and some of which may not apply to the relevant joinder
question, see F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 42, ch. 10; 3A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE,
supra note 2, ~ 19; 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, §§ 1600-26.
206. The rulemakers recommended that courts encourage absentees to initiate the measures and
consider if undue hardship would result. Professor Kaplan suggested that if hardship did not occur,
absentee "inaction with knowledge may be pertinent" to dismissal or continuing. See Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 92; Kaplan, supra note 5, at 365-66. In Provident Tradesmens
Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 114 (1968), the Court indicated that an absentee who
fails to enter a case when able to do so might be bound by a determination in that suit. Accord
Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 77 F.R.D. 448, 452 (D.D.C. 1978). The resolution suggested
would implicate due process because "due process prohibits the assertion of claim or issue preclusion
against one who was neither a party to prior litigation nor represented by ... a party there." Freer,
supra note 16, at 1082; see also 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 1608, at 76 (noting that
the Supreme Court has not conclusively resolved the issue of whether absentees might be bound); 18
c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE. & PROCEDURE.: CIVIL§ 4452 (1981) (suggesting
approaches for resolving issue). Absentees also may intervene on appeal, as happened in Conner v.
Burford, 605 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mont. 1985), appeal filed, No. 85-3935 (9th Cir. argued July 11,
1986). For discussion of the problem of absentee notification in public rights litigation, see supra
notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
207. Absentees employed arrangements similar to this in Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1986); Conner v. Burford, 605 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mont. 1985), appeal filed,
No. 85-3935 (9th Cir. argued July 11, 1986); and National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) 1609 (D.D.C. 1985) (mem.), aff'd on rehearing, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1082 (D.D.C.
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more appropriate forum when the district selected by the plaintiff is too inconvenient. 208 Numerous other measures could be invoked by litigants or judges. For
example, governmental defendants may be able to represent absentees adequately. Agencies might also be able to secure absentee presence in cases involving a res like land through mechanisms such as interpleader.209 Of course,
defendants and plaintiffs always can inform absentees that suit has been brought,
and courts may notify absentees and invite their participation.210 Judges, however, have many additional devices at their command. Courts might transfer
cases to another forum "in the interest of justice"211 or certify a class of absentees when they are sufficiently numerous. 212 Judges may also be able to protect
absentees by delaying absentee realization of interests pending governmental
compliance with the plaintiff's request for relief. 213 For instance, courts could
postpone Interior Department issuance of permits to absentees for development
of natural resources discovered on the public lands until the Department completed preparation of an environmental impact statement considering the environmental consequences of development. 214 Accordingly, in numerous
situations the plaintiff's interest will be so much larger than absentees' interests
as to clearly outweigh them.
In a small number of situations, however, essentially the opposite situation
1986) (mem.), appeal filed, Nos. 86-5239, 86-5240 (D.C. Cir. 1986). For helpful analyses of "public
interest groups," like Mountain States Legal Foundation, that represent regulated interests, see
Houck, supra note 62; Farney, Mountain States' Conservative Legal Bite Loses Strength Due to Funding Woes, Ideological Rifts, Wall St. J., Jan. 30, 1987, at 50, col. 1.
208. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) & 1406(a) (1982) prescribe transfer if it is "in the interest of justice;"
See also 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-3 (1987) (administrative conference of the United States Recommendation that Congress expressly provide for intervenor transfer requests). For additional discussion of
transfer, see Coalition on Sensible Transp., Inc. v. Dole, 631 F. Supp. 1382, 1387-88 (D.D.C. 1986);
15 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL, § 3807, at 78-79; § 3827,
at 172 (1976); see also Freer, supra note 16, at 1098 n. 179 (requiring intervention does not take from
absentee's due process objections to suit's locus).
209. For helpful analysis ofinterpleader, see Freer, supra note 16, at 1093-94. lmpleader also is
available. See FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a). However, both mechanisms generally are inapplicable. See
supra notes 93, 158-59 and accompanying text (discussing the fortuity of, and difficulties entailed in
ensuring, adequate representation).
210. See Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 93-94. Courts considering the joinder
question cannot compel absentees to enter the litigation. But if judges in subsequent litigation consider absentees bound by the earlier case, see supra note 206, the possibility of such later treatment
could effectively compel entry and might have due process implications. Of course, an important
problem in some public rights litigation has been the failure of plaintiffs and defendants to notify the
court of absentees' existence, much less notify absentees of the litigation. See supra notes 137-38 and
accompanying text.
211. See supra note 208.
212. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. Rule 19 and rule 23 are mutually exclusive, because rule 23 presupposes that the number of entities involved renders joinder impracticable. Nonetheless, rule
23(b)(l), which mirrors rule 19(a)(2) and is meant to address similar prejudice, affords the possibility
of a class action when the number of absentees is substantial.
213. The possibility of shaping relief implicates rule 19(b)'s second stated factor, suggesting that
courts consider the "extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of
relief, or other measures [absentee] prejudice can be lessened or avoided." FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b).
214. Similar possibilities were suggested in NRDC v. Berklund, 458 F. Supp. 925, 933 (D.D.C.
1978), aff'd, 609 F.2d 553 (D.C.Cir. 1979) (per curiam) and NRDC v. TVA, 340 F. Supp. 400, 408
(S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 459 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1972). For discussion of certain
difficulties entailed in shaping relief, like absentee need to explore during short seasons, see infra note
231 and accompanying text.
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will be present. In most of these instances absentees' interests will be substantial
should the case continue, while the plaintiff's interest will be insignificant if the
case is dismissed. More specifically, absentees' needs to protect their interests in
such situations will be very difficult to accommodate. The plaintiff's ability to
choose a forum in public rights litigation means that the case could proceed in a
forum quite distant from and very inconvenient for absentees. Moreover, in
public rights litigation, the peculiar character of the questions at issue, the substantial nature of absentee interests at stake, the telling effect on those interests
of entering judgment, and the special character of existing government compensation systems mean that absentees could be affected significantly were the plaintiff to sue successfully.215 Therefore, entering the litigation would be quite
expensive for absentees, while continuing without absentees would prejudice
·their interests substantially.
As to absentee expense for example, public interest litigants often challenge
in the District Court for the District of Columbia governmental activity relating
to public lands situated in the West and implicating interests of absentees located there. 216 Moreover, prejudice to absentees of proceeding without them is
illustrated by the several ways in which absentees' opportunities to protect their
interests may effectively be precluded. When one federal court has adjudicated
the applicability or statutory meaning of national legislation that implicates absentees' interests, another federal court will be unlikely to view the legislation
differently. 217 When a trial judge has resolved sharply contested issues of fact
implicating absentees' interests, appellate courts likely will defer to those determinations. 218 Moreover, absentees cannot successfully pursue subsequent litiga215. See infra notes 217-18 and accompanying text (noting the peculiar character of questions at
issue). For explanations and examples of the remaining propositions, see supra notes 4, 117-18 and
accompanying text; infra notes 238-39 and accompanying text.
216. See, e.g., National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609 (D.D.C.
1985) (mem.), aff'd on rehearing, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1082 (D.D.C. 1986) (mem.), appeal filed,
Nos. 86-5239, 86-5240 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see also National Coal Ass'n v. Clark, 603 F. Supp. 668
(D.D.C. 1984) (court dismissed litigation against government brought by coal producers' trade association in District of Columbia involving public lands in Montana and suggested that District Court
for District of Montana was an adequate alternative forum); Swomley v. Watt, 526 F. Supp. 1271
(D.D.C. 1981) (suit involving lands in Oklahoma).
217. For helpful discussion of numerous reasons for this judicial reluctance and its implications,
see NRDC v. NRC, 578 F.2d 1341, 1344-45 (10th Cir. 1978); Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 699703 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 828-29 (5th Cir. 1967).
Within each federal circuit, courts are especially reluctant to view legislation differently, because of
considerations of judicial economy, mutual respect, stare decisis, practice, and custom. Some of
these considerations also operate between circuits, although circuits are more willing to differ. See,
e.g., Gee v. Boyd, 471 U.S. 1058 (1985) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), see also
Comment, Administrative Agency lntracircuit Non-Acquiescence, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 582 (1985)
(noting sporadic government agency practice of not following precedent within circuits).
218. See Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 732 F.2d 261, 265-67 (2d Cir. 1984); FED. R. C1v.
P. 52(a); 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL,§§ 2585, 2589
(1971); see also Louis, A/locating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the Trial and
Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, The Judge/Jury Question, and Procedural
Discretion, 64 N.C.L. REv. 993, 1007-17 (1986) (documenting "shift of decisional power towards the
trial level"). Given this deferential standard of appellate review, absentees may lose the only meaningful opportunity to protect themselves. Trial judges apparently have resolved factual issues without absentees in few public rights cases, although this did happen in Conner v. Burford, 605 F.
Supp. 107 (D. Mont 1985), appeal filed, No. 85-3935 (9th Cir. argued July 11, 1986).
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tion against the government for investments made in reliance on government
representations, because satisfactory relief is unavailable under existing compensation schemes.219
In some situations, when absentee interests are great, the plaintiff's interest
will be small. In the remaining cases, in which the plaintiff's forum needs are
more substantial, they can be accommodated by invoking certain rather convenient measures. A court may transfer the case, when all the absentees are located in a single federal district other than the forum selected by the plaintiff.220
A judge may also dismiss the plaintiff's litigation, if the plaintiff can file suit
again relatively easily in a district where absentees could protect their interests
more conveniently. 221 Dismissal even may be possible when the plaintiff can sue
relatively conveniently in more than one forum and combine actions with multidistrict litigation in a forum where absentees could be represented conveniently
by a single entity. 222
In short, the rule 19(b) inquiry can be completed rather easily and appropriately in numerous instances because the plaintiff's or absentees' interests will
predominate. However, a number of other situations can be resolved with similar facility by re-examining, and refining, plaintiffs' and absentees' interests or by
consulting additional pertinent considerations.
b.
i.

Secondary Survey

Refinement of the Plaintiff's and Absentees' Interests

The plaintiff's interest should be analyzed in terms of the efficacy of pursuing relief in the forum chosen or elsewhere. The absentees' interests should be
considered with respect to the prejudice that would be incurred in continuing
without them, how effectively available mechanisms can protect absentees' interests, and the inconvenience of invoking the measures. Thus, considerable analysis should be undertaken by a court when conducting the rule 19(b) preliminary
survey and the rule 19(a) assessment of absentee interest and prejudice.223
Nonetheless, rule 19(b) requires more refined analysis at this juncture, because
neither the plaintiff's nor absentees' interests significantly outweighed the other
in the preliminary survey. Thus, both interests should be assessed more closely,
especially in light of the implications of applying the measures mentioned above,
219. See infra notes 238-39 and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
221. See, e.g., McKenna v. Udall, 418 F.2d 1171, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1969); National Coal Ass'n v.
Clark, 603 F. Supp. 668 (D.D.C. 1984).
222. Numerous plaintiffs' "public interest groups," such as the Sierra Club; public interest
groups representing those regulated, like Mountain States Legal Foundation (MSLF); and trade
associations, such as the American Mining Congress, have offices in Washington, D.C. Most of
these entities also have offices in the West. For example, the Sierra Club has offices in Denver,
Colorado, San Francisco, California, and Juneau, Alaska, while MSLF is headquartered in Denver.
For more information on multidistrict litigation, see 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1982); D. HERR, MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION (1986); 15 c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 208, at§§ 3861-3900; infra note
229.
223. See, e.g., supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text (relevant analysis of the plaintiff's
interests); supra notes 149-67, 204-14 and accompanying text (relevant analysis of absentees'
interests).
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to determine whether one interest predominates. 224
The plaintiff's interest can be refined by assessing the consequences of continuing the litigation in the forum where plaintiff brought the action, assuming
that absentees would be willing to enter the suit.225 For example, judges might
calculate the costs of securing absentee presence in the case, which could include
the expense of identifying absentees in government records and notifying the
absentees, 226 or courts might consider to what extent entry of absentees might
complicate the litigation.227 Judges may also refine their analysis of the plaintiff's interests by exploring the implications of ordering dismissal, assuming the
availability of an alternative forum. For instance, courts could estimate the cost
of relitigating in another district, including the expense entailed in traveling to a
distant forum. 228 They could also consider the extent to which plaintiff's relief
would be delayed were suits brought in multiple districts and combined through
the multidistrict litigation mechanism. 229
Judges can refine their analysis of absentees' interests by analyzing the potential prejudice absentees could suffer if the plaintiff's case proceeded without
them. For example, courts should examine the precise legal nature, or magnitude, of absentees' interests or evaluate what effect judgment would have on
224. This analysis is not intended to be exhaustive but rather suggests promising approaches by
affording examples that are most likely to occur. Measures whose application was rejected in the
preliminary survey, because one interest predominated or because the measures were relatively inconvenient, may well apply here. The interests at this point are relatively similar and can profitably
be refined by comparing them in terms of the relative inconvenience to each of invoking the
measures.
225. Absentees cannot be compelled to enter the suit. See supra note 210. Other assumptions
that are important will be discussed later, but some will not be discussed for reasons of convenience
and brevity. For example, it is superfluous to repeat the determination made earlier that absentee
joinder is infeasible. Cases like Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), which say the
federal judiciary is to follow strictly or read literally the requirements of the Federal Rules, arguably
make irrelevant consideration of factors not mentioned explicitly in rule 19, such as expenses the
plaintiff might incur. But the Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, does state that rule
19(b)'s "fourth factor, looking to the practical effects of a dismissal, indicates that the court should
consider whether there is any assurance that the plaintiff, if dismissed, could sue effectively in another forum where better joinder would be possible." Id. at 93. Thus, the plaintiff's expense appears
relevant to whether suit could be brought elsewhere. See infra note 251. Moreover, courts may
consider factors pertinent to equity and good conscience, much as those discussed infra text accompanying notes 247-51. See supra note 195.
226. For discussion of the difficulties entailed in identifying absentees, much less securing their
presence, in public rights litigation, see supra note 180.
227. For example, entry of a large number of absentees could complicate the litigation considerably were they to demand that numerous, new issues be treated. See infra note 250 and accompanying text. Application of representational substitutes, in tum, then may be appropriate. See supra
notes 180, 207 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text.
229. One court rejected the multidistrict litigation option, because it would "create enormous
administrative disorder and delay" and effectively end the suit. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford,
23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609 (D.D.C. 1985) (mem.), ajf'd on rehearing, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA)
1082 (D.D.C. 1986), appeal filed, Nos. 86-5239, 86-5240 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see also supra note 222
(discussing the multidistrict litigation option). Delay can be important in certain public rights litigation, especially cases challenging activity like mining on the public lands that threatens endangered
species, such as grizzly bears. See, e.g., Cabinet Mountains Wilderness/Scotchman's Peak Grizzly
Bears v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1982). For cogent treatment of the effect of delaying the
plaintiff's relief and of the financial implications for public interest litigants of invoking many measures, see Coalition on Sensible Transp., Inc. v. Dole, 631 F. Supp. 1382, 1386-88 (D.D.C. 1986);
Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 77 F.R.D. 448, 451 (D.D.C. 1978).
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those interests. This could be done by considering various factors, such as the
nature of the questions to be resolved in the suit, the character of the remedy
sought by the plaintiff, or the unavailability of later, effective relief against the
govemment. 230 Judges could also refine absentees' interests by determining how
efficaciously existing measures would protect those interests. For example, a
judicial attempt to protect absentees by delaying realization of their interests
pending governmental compliance with the plaintiff's requested relief can substantially harm those absentees who wish to explore for natural resources on
public lands and who have only short seasons in which to conduct such operations. 231 Courts as well could refine their analysis of absentees' interests by examining the convenience of applying certain mechanisms. For example, judges
might estimate the absentees' expense of entering the action, which could include examining information such as the absentees' distance from the forum. 232
When refined judicial analysis indicates that either the plaintiff's or absentees' interests are significantly larger, this determination will be conclusive. 233
But even if there is not considerable disparity between them, that differential
should suffice. 234 Nonetheless, in the small number of situations in which the
disparities between the two interests are relatively small, courts should evaluate
other pertinent considerations.235

ii. Additional Relevant Considerations
Courts should analyze unexplored dimensions of rule 19(b)'s four stated
factors by examining the potential ramifications of both continuing without requiring absentee joinder and dismissing the plaintiff's case for interests other
than those of plaintiffs and absentees. 236 The principal result of continuing the
suit is multiple litigation, especially its impact on the defendant and the pub230. These factors are all considered supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text.
231. See Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466, 468 (9th Cir. 1986) (example of
absentee with short season); Conner v. Burford, 605 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mont. 1985) (example of
absentee with short season), appeal filed, No. 85-3935 (9th Cir. argued July 11, 1986); supra notes
213-14 and accompanying text (general discussion of shaping relief). Of course, these cases provide
the foil to the plaintiff's argument regarding delayed relief, discussed supra note 229 and accompanying text. In National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609, 1613 (D.D.C.
1985) (mem.), aff'd on rehearing, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1082 (D.D.C. 1986), appeal filed, Nos. 865239, 86-5240 (D.C. Cir. 1986), the court found it impossible to shape relief to protect absentees, and
this may be true of much other public rights litigation. See also Freer, supra note 16, at 1095 n.166
(making similar observation about private litigation).
232. The Advisory Committee Note states that the "court should consider whether [entry]
would impose undue hardship on the absentee." Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at
92. For mechanisms that might ameliorate expense, such as representation by entities like MSLF,
see supra note 207 and accompanying text.
233. For example, closer scrutiny may reveal one interest is much different than it appeared
initially.
234. For instance, the plaintiff's forum needs, although not gigantic, may be considerable, and
absentee prejudice may be more than minimal, yet relatively small.
235. For example, the plaintiff may have a rather inefficacious forum, while absentees would be
comparably (1) prejudiced, if suit proceeded or (2) inconvenienced in protecting their interests.
236. Interests of the plaintiff and absentees were found relatively similar under the preceding
analysis. Other interests are examined now, because in most situations they become significant only
at this point.
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lic. 237 In cases involving vindication of public rights, there is little prospect of
successful, subsequent suit by absentees against the government. Later litigation
is likely only when the public rights case prejudiced absentees significantly, and
even then the government may have no legal obligation or the injury may not
support a cause of action. 238 For example, absentees who have invested substantial funds exploring for natural resources in reliance on government-issued leases
that the courts effectively invalidated in public rights litigation may have no
satisfactory remedy against the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
Court of Claims suits, or the Constitution. 239 But if courts find that such subsequent litigation is possible, they should estimate costs to the government, 240 the
judicial system, and ultimately the public in hearing similar claims.241 Courts
should also assess the effect on interests other than the plaintiff and absentees of
dismissing the plaintiff's case. The chief consequence is ending the plaintiff's
suit, which implicates numerous "public policy" factors, such as resolution of
controversial issues on their merits and government accountability. 242 More
specifically, one judge recently characterized the public's interest in management
of the public lands as a "matter of transcending importance."243 Other, less
significant, because less likely, consequences of dismissing are that dismissed
plaintiffs will be able to relitigate in an alternative forum or sue in more than one
district and combine cases through multidistrict litigation. 244 If those alternatives appear viable, courts should consider the costs to the public and the judicial system should the options be exercised.245
237. Multiple litigation that results from continuing implicates rule 19(b)'s first three stated factors, relating to interests "of the courts and the public in complete, consistent, and efficient settlement of controversies" and of defendants in avoiding more suits or inconsistent obligations.
Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 110-12 (1968); cf Rule 19
Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 92-93 (discussing multiple litigation and three factors).
238. See supra notes 149-67 and accompanying text (discussing absentee prejudice); supra note
118 and accompanying text (citing concrete example of absentee prejudice created by government).
239. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2412, 2671 (1982) (Federal Tort
Claims Act); id. § 1491 (1982) (Court of Claims). The lack of effective relief may implicate due
process. See Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 325-28 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (discussing possible due
process claims); see also Heckler v. Community Health Servs. of Crawford, 467 U.S. 51, 59-62
(1984) (stating that government rarely estopped by unauthorized acts of agents); Union Oil Co. v.
Morton, 512 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1975) (United States not estopped by unauthorized acts of agents
regarding public lands). Moreover, this consideration fundamentally distinguishes public rights
from private litigation, in which absentees generally can secure some relief in later litigation. See,
e.g., Helzberg's Diamond Shops, Inc. v. Valley West Des Moines Shopping Center, Inc., 564 F.2d
816 (8th Cir. 1977). Cases in which the public rights exception was recognized have not engendered
later suits, but they have prolonged litigation. See supra notes 4, 118. That development implicates
"public interests" in fair absentee treatment; vindication of interests they assert, such as domestic
production of oil, when legitimate; and judicial economy, credibility, and respect. See Heckler, 467
U.S. at 61-62; United States v. Wharton, 514 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1975) (stating that public has
interest in government treating citizens fairly).
240. These might include the costs of trying cases and paying judgments.
241. Hearing similar claims also implicates judicial economy, credibility, and respect.
242. See supra notes 100-06 and accompanying text.
243. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609, 1613-14 (D.D.C.
1985) (mem.), ajf'd on rehearing, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1082 (D.D.C. 1986), appeal.filed, Nos. 865239, 86-5240 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
244. See supra notes 221-22, 229 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 221-22, 229, 241 and accompanying text; see also National Wildlife Fed'n v.
Burford, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609, 1613 (D.D.C. 1985) (mem.) (noting that the multidistrict
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Judges then should analyze considerations either not stated in the rule or
those previously examined only indirectly. 246 One consideration may be the
time when the court initially treated the joinder issue. For example, if the question were first addressed on appeal, preservation of the judgment, resources
spent on the trial below, whether absentees knew that litigation was ongoing,
and why the issue was only treated at this juncture could be important. 247 A
second consideration might be the good faith of the entities whose interests are
involved, insofar as judges can detect such conduct, and the equities implicated.
In determining·good faith, judges should ask whether the plaintiff failed to join
absentees because unaware of their existence, because joinder was infeasible, or
for strategic purposes. Similarly, the courts should consider whether the governmental defendant moved for dismissal of the plaintiff's suit to prevent absentee prejudice or to avoid a substantive judicial determination that the agency was
violating its statutory mandate. Concomitantly, courts should ask whether absentees failed to enter the case because they received no notification, because
entry would have been relatively inconvenient, or because they hoped to have
the plaintiff's action dismissed for non-joinder. 248 In examining equities, the
court could ask how substantially the less creditable behavior affected interests
of other entities and how such conduct might count against those who participated in the activity. 249 Another consideration could be the effects, not yet
treated fully, of invoking certain options. For instance, if the suit continued and
particular absentees were to enter, would the litigation be expedited by their
contributions to issue resolution or be delayed by their demands that additional
issues be treated? 25 Considerations, such as the relative resources that parties

°

litigation option would "create enormous administrative disorder and delay"), aff'd on rehearing, 24
Env't Rep. (BNA) 1082 (D.D.C. 1986), appeal filed, Nos. 86-5239, 86-5240 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The
considerations discussed in this paragraph will rarely control; if they do, however, the inquiry can
end.
246. Of course, some of these considerations were mentioned in examining rule 19{b)'s four
stated factors or in conducting the analysis discussed earlier. See supra note 195 (noting why it is
proper to consider unstated factors).
247. Timing can be more problematic in public rights litigation than in traditional private litigation, because plaintiffs often fail to notify the court of absentees' existence under rule 19(c), while
governmental defendants have less incentive to notify the court or absentees. See supra notes 136-38
and accompanying text. For helpful discussions of timing, see Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust
Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 109-12 (1968); Preston v. Thompson, 589 F.2d 300, 304 (7th Cir.
1978); Kirkland v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420, 424 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976). For more discussion of the timing issue under rules 19 and 24, see
7 c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 1609; 7A c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2,
§ 1916.
248. Thus, courts evaluating good faith might consider how objectionable the behavior was and
why entities participated in it. For a helpful example that assesses the conduct of the players, see
Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 110-13 (1968); accord Freer,
supra note 16, at 1080.
249. For example, when the moving party seeks dismissal to protect against subsequent suit by
absentees, "undue delay in making the motion can properly be counted against him as a reason for
denying the motion." Rule 19 Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 20, at 93; accord Provident
Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 110 n.4 (1968); see also United States v.
Sabine Shell, Inc., 674 F.2d 480, 482-83 (5th Cir. 1982) (rejecting defendant's motion on equitable
grounds, including failure to raise until appeal). Correspondingly, it is often fair to proceed when
absentees refuse to enter the litigation and the government urges dismissal for non-joinder, because
government error at once could benefit absentees and be shielded from public scrutiny.
250. The court in NRDC v. TVA, 340 F. Supp. 400, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd on other
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command and the probable outcome on the merits, also may apply. 251
Once all pertinent considerations have been explored, courts should determine whether one, or a combination, controls.252 Judges should be able to treat
nearly all remaining cases easily and appropriately, because such a large number
of considerations ought to have been examined and valued, and because so many
measures can be invoked. For instance, when a number of important considerations point to the same conclusion, the joinder issue should be easily resolvable.
More specifically, litigation should proceed when there are national policy issues
that need resolution and one organization could efficaciously represent many
dispersed absentees that hold mineral leases on public lands and expedite the
litigation by offering valuable information on lease issuance. 253 But even when
the situation is less clear, the plethora of considerations and their variable values
as well as the mechanisms available should mean that courts can reach conclusions rather easily.
Nonetheless, a miniscule of relatively unclear situations may remain. For
example, most significant considerations may point to application of different
measures or to multiple conclusions. Although the inquiry may now appear
considerably more art than science, and although it is debatable how finely the
analysis should or can be calibrated, certain techniques can be applied. For example, the relevant considerations could be valued in terms of their comparative
importance and their extent, and balanced. Therefore, judges should re-examine
these considerations alone, 254 or with the plaintiff's and absentees' interests, as
refined, to determine the appropriate result. 255
grounds, 459 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1972), found the potential absentee contribution to issue resolution
relevant, while the absentees in Conner v. Burford, 605 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mont. 1985), apparently
could have provided material data about the important issue oflease stipulations' efficacy. See also
National Farm Lines v. ICC, 564 F.2d 381, 383-84 (10th Cir. 1977) (similar relevance as to rule 24).
Other courts have evinced concern about the effect on the instant litigation of entry of numerous
absentees. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609, 1613 (D.D.C.
1985) (mem.), aff'd on rehearing, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1082 (mem.), appeal.filed, Nos. 85-5239, 855240 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Dintino v. Dorsey, 91 F.R.D 280, 283 (E.D. Pa. 1981); supra note 227 and
accompanying text; see also Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 107 S. Ct. 1177 (1987)
(in complex litigation, district judge's Rule 24 decision on how best to balance parties rights against
need to keep litigation from becoming unmanageable entitled to great deference).
251. Judge Gasch, in Coalition on Sensible Transp., Inc. v. Dole, 631 F. Supp. 1382, 1386-88,
(D.D.C. 1986) and Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 77 F.R.D. 448, 451 (D.D.C. 1978), considered
pertinent the financial hardship to public interest litigants of invoking numerous options. Some
matters may warrant less weight. Compare 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 1607, at 64
n.73 with FED. PROC. L. ED., supra note 177, § 59:76 (opposing views of the relevance of the probable outcome on the merits). For helpful catalogs of additional relevant considerations that may be
applicable in specific cases, see 7 c. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 1607; FED. PROC. L.
ED., supra note 177, § 59:76.
252. The interests of the plaintiff and absentees are not considered at this point, because they
heretofore have been found relatively similar, and the new considerations may yield a clear
conclusion.
253. This apparently is what occurred in National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1609 (D.D.C. 1985) (mem.), aff'd on rehearing, 24 Envt Rep. (BNA) 1082 (D.D.C. 1986)
(mem.), appeal filed, Nos. 86-5239, 86-5240 (D.C. Cir. 1986). See also NRDC v. NRC, 578 F.2d
1341, 1346 (10th Cir. 1978) (discussing similar considerations in context of rule 24).
254. Plaintiff and absentee interests, because they are relatively similar, will suggest a conclusion
when one interest and the additional considerations tilt towards this conclusion, as when both favor
dismissal.
255. Given everything examined above, it seems virtually inconceivable that any circumstances
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In sum, rule 19 and additional existing mechanisms enable judges to solve
the party joinder question in public rights litigation more satisfactorily than the
public rights exception by accommodating plaintiffs' forum needs and other interests, particularly those of absentees.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Numerous federal judges have created, applied, and perpetuated a public
rights exception to treat a difficult party joinder problem presented by public
rights litigation. Although a number of judges have attempted to enunciate,
evaluate, and justify the exception, none has succeeded. Some courts apparently
fashioned the exception out of solicitude for plaintiffs or concern that rule 19's
application would effectively preclude public rights cases, but few judges expressly exhibited regard for additional pertinent interests, especially those of absentees. Indeed, solicitude for plaintiffs has been excessive and lack of concern
for other interests inappropriate. Moreover, doubts about rule 19 have been ungrounded. Application of the rule and additional measures available to courts,
litigants, absentees, and counsel will permit judges to facilitate plaintiffs' vindication of public rights and better serve others, namely absentees. Therefore,
courts should rely on rule 19 and other available mechanisms, rather than engage in cryptic, unclear, and strained analysis to support an exception the application of which has engendered protracted litigation, wasted resources, and even
eroded judicial credibility.

will remain in which the plaintiff's and absentees' interests are so similar that other relevant considerations and measures available do not tip that delicate balance. In the extremely unlikely event that
such a situation should arise, the rule's language and underlying policies will not provide a clear
solution. That phraseology and those policies evince remarkably similar solicitude for plaintiffs and
absentees, expressing a preference for neither, although the federal judiciary has elevated the plaintiff's forum needs to primary significance, see supra note 197. Thus, there may be two "innocent
parties," each a victim of government error. Perhaps the inquiry then devolves into a philosophical
debate over the principal purpose of rule 19 as applied in the context of public rights litigation-the
plaintiff's forum needs, absentee prejudice, and the interests of the judiciary and the public in efficacious dispute resolution-that cannot be resolved.

